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"The first call of a theory of law is that it should fit the facts."
- Oliver Wendell Holmes'
INTRODUCING BEHAVIORAL REALISM
Although they serve different social functions and employ different
methods and tools, both law and the empirical social sciences need, use,
and produce theories of human behavior. But their respective relationships
to these theories differ in significant ways, and for this reason, law and so-
cial science often stand in tension with each other when they meet in the
courtroom or the case reporter.
For its part, law needs, uses, and produces theories of human behavior
when judges elaborate constitutional or common law doctrines or interpret
ambiguous statutory provisions that implicate human motivation, subjec-
tive experience, or choice. Legal actors (judges, jurors, administrative fact
finders, dispute handlers, and disputants) also use behavioral theories when
they evaluate, litigate, or adjudicate specific disputes, as they attempt, for
example, to attribute causation, assess witness credibility, or determine
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whether particular evidentiary facts constitute persuasive circumstantial
evidence of some ultimate fact at issue in a particular case.
Acceptance of judicial authority depends heavily on jurisprudential
stability, continuity, and adherence to precedent. As a result, judges are
understandably hesitant to endorse proposed changes to the unstated psy-
chological models underpinning legal doctrine, particularly if this would
require modifying the doctrine itself. Consequently, as this Article dis-
cusses, behavioral theory change2 comes slowly to law, when it comes at
all.
In contrast to law, the empirical social sciences construct and use
theories of human behavior with a more accepting eye toward their possi-
ble emendation, supplementation, or even outright replacement. While
change in the behavioral theories embedded in law is viewed, most sympa-
thetically, as a periodic necessary evil fraught with institutional peril, theo-
retical revision in the empirical social sciences codes as progress. To be
sure, scientific communities resist fundamental theory change, as historians
of science have vividly described.' Nonetheless, the point re-
mains: empirical social scientists expect that as empirical investigation
continues and progress is made, the behavioral theories structuring their
fields will evolve. In short, empirical psychology progressively refines its
descriptive theories of human behavior because it is the goal of empirical
psychology to do just that.
It is not the goal of law, however, to refine behavioral theories-even
the behavioral theories embedded within legal doctrines. It is the goal of
law to structure public and private ordering, to provide mechanisms for
efficacious dispute resolution, and, in the process, to safeguard popular
perceptions of judicial legitimacy. While the enterprise we call empirical
social science is fundamentally descriptive, law is fundamentally norma-
tive. So, as we will describe, when law uses behavioral theories, it does so
not in the interests of the theories themselves, but in pursuit of other goals.
For these and other reasons, the behavioral theories embedded in legal
doctrines often go unstated. Even when stated, they are often unexamined,
and they are almost never empirically tested, except perhaps by a small
cadre of empirical "law and" scholars whose articles judges seldom read.4
2. To clarify, when in this Article we use the term "theory change" in reference to law, we are
not referring to changes in legal theories themselves (e.g. disparate impact or disparate treatment theory
in discrimination cases, or the theory of constructive intent in tort). Rather, we are speaking of the
behavioral theories used by judges in constructing, applying, or justifying those legal theories. Our
focus is on the psychological metatheories underpinning legal theories, not the legal theories
themselves.
3. See, e.g., THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1996)
(1962).
4. A fair amount of circumstantial evidence supports the claim that judges rarely read legal
scholarship. See, e.g., Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: 1971-1999,
75 IND. L.J. 1009, 1009-10 (2000) (reporting a decline in Supreme Court citation of legal scholarship);
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Sometimes, behavioral theories enter case law as mere rhetorical flour-
ishes, used to justify legal decisions made for reasons having nothing to do
with the empirical validity of the theories themselves. However, once em-
bedded in published decisions, a behavioral theory can develop preceden-
tial legitimacy, and for that reason be difficult to modify, even if it is
empirically unsound.
When litigants attempt to use social scientific theories in factual adju-
dication, rules of evidence provide at least some institutionalized gatekeep-
ing role in scrutinizing those theories' validity.' But there is no systematic
method through which the validity of behavioral theories used in legal rea-
soning is tested. Behavioral theories can thus enter and remain embedded
in legal doctrine long after they have been disconfirmed or superseded by
advances in the empirical social sciences.
The resulting inconsistencies between the real world and the phe-
nomenological models embedded in law can be highly problematic. As
Professor Krieger has argued in earlier work on antidiscrimination law,
discontinuities between jurisprudential models of intergroup bias and the
real world phenomena those models purport to represent have serious nega-
tive effects. These negative effects include normative ambiguity, adjudica-
tive inefficiency and inaccuracy, and perhaps even an exacerbation of the
very intergroup tensions antidiscrimination laws were enacted to diffuse.6
As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote in 1881, "The first call of a
theory of law is that it should fit the facts."7 In context, of course, Holmes
was referring to descriptive theories of law; he was not constructing, at
least at that point, a prescriptive theory of judicial decision making. More
recently, however, as typified by Justice Souter's dissent in United States v.
Morrison,8 Holmes's "first call" principle has emerged as a rallying cry
against the premising of legal doctrines on inaccurate conceptions of real
world conditions. Used in this way, Holmes's "first call" principle points to
Michael D. McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51
OKLA. L. REV. 659, 660 (1998) (finding a 47% decline in the use of legal scholarship by courts over the
previous two decades, with the most notable decline in the 1990s); see also Harry T. Edwards, The
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992)
(complaining that much of interdisciplinary legal scholarship is impractical and useless to courts);
Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1324 (2002) (observing that
"interdisciplinary legal scholarship is intended to be read by professors... rather than by practitioners
(including judges)").
5. See discussion infra p. 1022 and note 81.
6. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1238-41 (1995)
[hereinafter Krieger, The Content of Our Categories].
7. HOLMES, supra note 1.
8. 529 U.S. 598, 655 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that, in declaring the Violence
Against Women Act unconstitutional, the majority's conception of the nature of twenty-first century
interstate commerce and the nature of the state-federal relationship failed Holmes's basic test that a
theory of law should "fit the facts").
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a prescriptive principle of adjudication, related to but distinct from the le-
gal realism Holmes presaged.
This new principle, which the contributors to this Symposium call
"behavioral realism," holds that as judges develop and elaborate substan-
tive legal theories, they should guard against basing their analyses on inac-
curate conceptions of relevant, real world phenomena. In this respect,
behavioral realism echoes naturalizing epistemology, which emerged in the
late 1960s with the work of W.V. Quine9 and has since made preliminary
forays into jurisprudence"° and evidence scholarship."
Naturalism's core claim, like that of behavioral realism, is methodo-
logical: philosophical inquiry should remain continuous with advances in
the empirical sciences. From this proposition, it follows that the develop-
ment of theories of human knowledge acquisition should not be a totally
conceptual, a priori endeavor. Rather, epistemic theories, both descriptive
and normative, should be periodically revisited and revised to incorporate
evolving understandings, derived from the empirical sciences, of how hu-
man cognitive processes actually work. 2
An epistemic theory, like a theory of adjudication, can be descriptive
or normative, and both types of theories can be naturalizing. 3 Descriptive
epistemic theories are naturalizing when they produce positive models that
are consistent with those validated by empirical research in the cognitive
sciences. Normative episternic theories are naturalizing when they are
structured in such a way that, based on relevant scientific evidence regard-
ing knowledge acquisition and belief formation, one can reasonably as-
sume that people will actually have the ability to comply with the
prescriptions the normative epistemic theory generates.14
The contention that descriptive theories of human knowledge acquisi-
tion should be revised in light of advances in the cognitive sciences seems
almost self-justifying. If key elements of a descriptive epistemic theory
have been empirically disconfirmed, the theory has lost any claim to de-
scriptive accuracy it might otherwise have had.
With respect to prescriptive theories, however, naturalism presents a
less obviously correct claim. What people actually tend to do does not nec-
essarily equate to what people should do. In the end, however, even natu-
ralism's normative claim is sound in the sense that one cannot expect much
9. W.V. QUINE, Epistemology Naturalized, in ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND OTHER ESSAYS
69(1969).
10. For an overview of naturalizing jurisprudence, see Brian Leiter, Naturalism and Naturalized
Jurisprudence, in ANALYZING LAW: NEW ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 79 (Brian Bix ed., 1998).
11. See generally Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of
Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491 (2001) (arguing that developments in epistemology can provide a
conceptual foundation for addressing common problems in the law of evidence).
12. ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, EPISTEMOLOGY AND COGNITION 53 (1986).
13. Alvin 1. Goldman, Epistemics: The Regulative Theory of Cognition, 75 J. PHIL. 509 (1978).
14. See id. at 513.
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regulatory work out of a prescriptive theory of human knowledge acquisi-
tion or belief formation that is based on faulty premises about how people
actually think.' 5 As Allen and Leiter put the matter, "[W]e cannot craft
epistemic norms (norms that would guide our acquisition of knowledge)
without empirical information."16
Behavioral realism in law stands for the proposition that legal theo-
ries, no less than their epistemological counterparts, both can and should be
naturalizing. Behavioral realism, like naturalism, stands for the proposition
that judges should not generate the behavioral theories sometimes used in
the construction or justification of legal doctrine through a solely concep-
tual, a priori process. To the extent that legal doctrines rely on stated or
unstated theories about the nature of real world phenomena, behavioral
realism argues, those theories should remain consistent with advances in
relevant fields of empirical inquiry. And where the real world phenomena
relevant to a particular area of law concern human social perception, moti-
vation, and judgment, the relevant domains of empirical inquiry with which
legal theories should remain consistent include cognitive social psychology
and the related social sciences.
In the context of antidiscrimination law, behavioral realism stands for
the proposition that judicial models---of what discrimination is, what
causes it to occur, how it can be prevented, and how its presence or ab-
sence can best be discerned in particular cases-should be periodically re-
visited and adjusted so as to remain continuous with progress in
psychological science.
The same earlier-described arguments defending naturalizing episte-
mology support the claim that antidiscrimination law should be naturaliz-
ing, that is, behaviorally realistic. First, antidiscrimination law should be
behaviorally realistic because a normative theory of nondiscrimination
based on faulty premises about how and why decision makers treat people
differently because of their social group status cannot realistically perform
much normative work. Even if people want to conform their behavior to
the norms underlying antidiscrimination law, full compliance with the
law's prescriptions is unlikely if the relevant legal doctrines fail to capture
accurately how and why discrimination occurs, how targets respond to it,
and what can be done to prevent it from occurring.'7 Furthermore, antidis-
crimination doctrine should be naturalizing, or behaviorally realistic, be-
cause a legal model of discrimination that fails to reflect accurately its real
15. Id.
16. Allen & Leiter, supra note 11, at 1494.
17. For example, in earlier work, Krieger demonstrated that the colorblindness approach to
nondiscrimination will fail as a normative theory because it is based on an empirically inaccurate model
of the psychological processes involved in biased intergroup perception and judgment. Linda Hamilton
Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After Affirmative Action, 86 CALIF. L. REV.
1251, 1276-93 (1998) [hereinafter Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika].
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world counterpart will prove inefficient and ineffective from a forensic
standpoint. Ironically, one might criticize such legal theories as lacking
field validity.
But law, of course, is not epistemology, and in interpreting statutes or
constitutional provisions, or in developing or amplifying common-law doc-
trines, judges are constrained by prudential considerations that hold no
claim on epistemologists. In construing statutes, for example, federal
judges are prudentially constrained by the statute's text, the judge's role as
an unelected official in a democratic society, and the principle of stare de-
cisis.
Of course, in many situations, empirically testable claims play no role
in the legal analysis grounding judicial interpretation of statutes or consti-
tutional provisions, or in the elaboration of common-law rules. But in in-
terpreting and applying ambiguous statutory provisions, in crafting legal
rules to incentivize behavior consistent with a statute's purpose, or in adju-
dicating individual cases, judges necessarily draw on models of real world
phenomena and incorporate those models into their legal reasoning. When
these models represent empirically testable--or even tested--claims, be-
havioral realism maintains that judges should take reasonable steps,
whether through the solicitation of expert testimony, amicus participation,
or otherwise, to make sure they have the science right.' 8
Stated in this way, the core principle underlying behavioral realism
seems obviously correct. But where psychological theories are involved,
judicial compliance with this principle is harder than one might suppose.
This is because judges, like most people, take for granted certain assump-
tions about how people behave and what motivates them. These assump-
tions seem self-evidently correct, even when they are wrong. For this
reason, judges sometimes incorporate empirically testable social science
claims into their legal reasoning without even noticing that they are doing
so. As we discuss in Part I, judges, no less than litigants, are quick to recite
and hesitant to question the behavioral theories that underpin established
legal doctrines.
Slowly, however, this may be changing. As Thomas Ulen has de-
scribed, 9 the emergence of law and economics has played a major role in
prodding legal scholarship-and, in certain instances, legal reasoning-
18. In response to those who would argue that judges cannot be expected to understand
psychological science, or apply its insights when making choices among competing legal rules, one
need only point to the enormous influence of economics on doctrinal questions in contract, securities
regulation, antitrust, and even employment discrimination law. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 19-22 (1992) (summarizing the influence of economics on law in a variety of
subject-matter areas). It is difficult to justify a double standard that would assume that judges are able
to distinguish good from bad economics but incapable of the same discernment in other social science
disciplines.
19. Thomas S. Ulen, The Unexpected Guest: Law and Economics, Law and Other Cognate
Disciplines, and the Future of Legal Scholarship, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 403, 404-05 (2004).
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toward a more scientific method of inquiry.20 Over time, other social sci-
ence disciplines, most notably sociology and cognitive psychology, have
extended the empirical interdisciplinary turn that law and economics initi-
ated. Within the academy, for example, the participation of social science
disciplines beyond neoclassical economics gave rise to the empirical wing
of the law and society school and to behavioral law and economics.
Despite their differences, these various "law and" schools share a
common methodology: they all seek to identify empirically testable as-
sumptions on which legal doctrine or policy initiatives are premised, ana-
lyze those assumptions using their respective disciplines' methods and
tools, and then use the results of that analysis to evaluate existing legal
doctrines or policies and, where indicated, to suggest reforms.
As part of this broad movement, there has emerged in the past ten
years a school of legal scholarship exploring the implications of insights
emerging from psychological science for antidiscrimination law and pol-
icy.21 Taken as a whole, this scholarship chronicles the many ways in which
20. See discussion infra Part 1I.B (text accompanying notes 74-78).
21. A complete cataloging of the relevant literature would be impractical for an essay of this
relative brevity, so we offer only a sampling of employment law related scholarship published during
the past ten years: Krieger, The Content of Our Categories, supra note 6 (applying insights from early
social cognition research to disparate treatment doctrine); Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika, supra note
17 (using insights from social and cognitive psychology to evaluate various arguments for and against
affirmative action); Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L. J. 1129 (1999)(arguing
against imposing Title VII liability for discrimination stemming from cognitive bias); Cynthia L.
Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1 (2000) (using
insights from social psychology and, in particular, the contact effect, to evaluate social gains derived
from workplace integration); Ann C. McGinley, !Viva La Evoluci6n!: Recognizing Unconscious
Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415 (2000) (extending Krieger's earlier analysis of
the implications of social cognition theory for proof of disparate treatment); Ian F. Haney-Lopez,
Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J.
1717 (2000) (drawing on new institutionalism and social cognition theory to explicate institutionalized
forms of race discrimination in the selection of grand jurors); Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal
Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CALIF. L. REV. 747, 748-53
(2001) (using cognitive social psychology to develop the concepts of devaluation and prototyping and
applying them to the law of intentional discrimination); Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention is
a Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and
Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2001) (examining
social science evidence regarding the effectiveness of diversity and anti-sexual-harassment training in
preventing discrimination and harassment); Rebecca Harmer White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose
Motive Matters?: Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495
(2001) (applying insights from the social psychology of group decision making to disparate treatment
cases involving multiple decision makers); Michelle A. Travis, Perceived Disabilities, Social Cognition
and "'Innocent Mistakes," 55 VAND. L. REV. 481 (2002) (applying social cognition theory to the
problem of disability discrimination); Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace
Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV.
91 (2003) (arguing that insights from cognitive social psychology should be used to inform how
disparate impact theory is interpreted and applied in employment-discrimination litigation); Tristin K.
Green, Targeting Workplace Context: Title VII as a Tool for Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV.
659 (2003) (extending her earlier analysis and applying it to issues relating to remedies); Gary Blasi,
Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons From Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241
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established civil rights jurisprudence is premised on models of social per-
ception and judgment that have been significantly discredited by empirical
work in social and cognitive psychology.
Reflecting this behavioral realist turn in civil rights scholarship, many
scholars have drawn on advances in the empirical social sciences to dem-
onstrate that what the law refers to as "intentional discrimination" can just
as easily result from the uncontrolled application of implicit, unconscious,
or automatic stereotypes and other subtle ingroup preferences as from the
operation of conscious discriminatory designs. These scholars, who include
both lawyers and social psychologists, endeavor to identify this broader set
of mental processes that results in disparate treatment of members of nega-
tively stereotyped or otherwise marginalized groups. In doing so, they gen-
erally advocate a causation-based, rather than an intent-based,
understanding of the antidiscrimination principle.22 They also support an
expansive application of disparate impact theory in cases involving subjec-
tive decision-making systems or other processes or criteria that tend to sys-
tematically deprive historically marginalized groups of employment
opportunities.23
Intellectual collaboration between lawyers and psychologists is noth-
ing new in American civil rights law. Collaborations between civil rights
lawyers, progressive legal scholars, and politically engaged social scientists
have contributed to some of the most important advances in federal civil
rights jurisprudence over the past half-century. The example that comes
most readily to mind, of course, is the collaboration between the NAACP
Legal Defense and Education Fund and the social scientists who authored
and signed the Social Science Statement submitted to the Supreme Court in
(2002) (exploring the consequences of cognitive biases in litigation involving members of stereotyped
groups); Lu-in Wang, Race as Proxy: Situational Racism and Self-Fulfilling Stereotypes, 53 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1013 (2004) (using insights from social cognition theory to argue that individual disparate
treatment adjudications are a poor policy tool for addressing modem forms of race discrimination);
Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741
(2005) (applying insights from social cognition theory to the problem of subjective employment
decision making systems).
22. White & Krieger, supra note 21; McGinley, supra note 21; Michael Selmi, Response to
Professor Wax, Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233 (1999); Evan
Tsen Lee & Ashutosh Bhagwat, The McClesky Puzzle: Remedying Prosecutorial Discrimination
Against Black Victims in Capital Sentencing, 1998 SuP. CT. REV. 145 (1998); Mary Ellen Maatman,
Choosing Words and Creating Worlds: The Supreme Court's Rhetoric and Its Constitutive Effects on
Employment Discrimination Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1998); Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional
Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279 (1997); Michael J. Zimmer,
The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate Treatment Discrimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. REV.
563, 600-09 (1996); Krieger, The Content of Our Categories, supra note 6, at 1242-43; David A.
Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (1989).
23. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 623 (2005);
Green, Targeting Workplace Context, supra note 21; Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief Look at
the Birth, Death, and Resurrection of the Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 431 (2005).
[Vol. 94:9971004
2006] BEHAVIORAL REALISM IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIM1NA TION LA W1005
Brown v. Board of Education.24 The American Psychological Association's
amicus participation in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,25 following on the
trial testimony of Susan T. Fiske, played a significant role in the Court's
endorsement of mixed motive theory in Title VII cases.
While these collaborations can reasonably be characterized as suc-
cessful, they could not accurately be described as uncontroversial. On the
contrary, they have long raised thorny and still hotly contested questions
about the proper role of social science in law generally, and in discrimina-
tion law more specifically. Brown's footnote eleven unleashed harsh criti-
cism, not only of Kenneth and Mamie Clark's doll studies, but of the very
notion that expert social psychological testimony had any proper role in
constitutional jurisprudence.26 Since the Supreme Court's 1993 decision in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,7 "social framework"28 and
related social science testimony has been met with renewed interest, and
skepticism, from both commentators and courts.2 9
Those who criticize the use of social science in shaping legal doctrine
have long argued that normative legal principles and traditional tools of
statutory and constitutional interpretation-not social science theories-
should guide substantive lawmaking.30 Judges, these critics demand,
24. See generally JOHN P. JACKSON, JR., SOCIAL SCIENTISTS FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE: MAKING THE
CASE AGAINST SEGREGATION 109-82 (2001) (examining the role of social scientists in the Brown
litigation).
25. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (endorsing the use of mixed motive theory in Title VII disparate
treatment cases).
26. The classic statement is Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,
73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31-34 (1959) (criticizing the use of social science research in the Supreme Court's
decision in Brown v. Board of Education). Other critical treatments include Monroe Berger,
Desegregation, Law, and Social Science, 23 COMMENTARY 471, 476 (1957) (noting that legal
protection from segregation should not depend on empirical findings of actual harm); Edmond Cahn,
Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 150, 157-58 (1955) (suggesting that empirical demonstrations are a
"flimsy foundation" on which to rest equality rights).
27. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
28. The use of the phrase "social framework" testimony in this context originates from Laurens
Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REv.
559 (1987). Walker and Monahan describe social framework testimony as the use of social science to
provide fact finders with a pattern of "general research results ... used to construct a frame of reference
or background context for deciding factual issues crucial to the resolution of a specific case." For a
recent discussion of the use of social framework testimony, see, e.g., William T. Bielby, Can I Get a
Witness? Challenges of Using Expert Testimony on Cognitive Bias in Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 377 (2003).
29. See Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles and Constitutional
Truths, 82 N.C. L. REV. 115 (2003) (arguing that empirical methods are ill suited to the discovery of
constitutional meaning); see also Kotla v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 898 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2004) (holding that social framework testimony about stereotyping in employment-discrimination
case was not useful to the trier of fact because the nature and effects of stereotypes are within people's
ordinary common knowledge).
30. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 6, 94 (1982).
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"should abandon the practice of basing their decisions on the basis of
empirical propositions."'"
Identifying the proper role of social science in substantive lawmaking
is an enormously complex theoretical undertaking, and it is not our purpose
to resolve here the many vexing questions that undertaking represents. Our
aim is far more modest. Using Title VII jurisprudence as a reference point,
we argue here that those who criticize the use of insights from empirical
social psychology in shaping or applying antidiscrimination doctrines are
overlooking one extremely important point-social psychology is already
there. In discrimination cases, as elsewhere, judges are constantly using
"intuitive" or "common sense" psychological theories in the construction
and justification of legal doctrines and in their application to specific legal
disputes. A psychologically trained eye can spot these intuitive psychologi-
cal theories all across Title VII's doctrinal landscape. Behavioral realism is
not a jurisprudential innovation; it is a jurisprudential corrective. In dis-
crimination law, there already is, and there has long been, an "intuitive
psychologist behind the bench."32
The problem is, as Stanford social psychologist Lee Ross observed
many years ago, the "intuitive psychologist" has significant shortcom-
ings.33 When subjected to empirical scrutiny, "common sense" theories of
how people perceive and judge themselves and others in their social envi-
ronment often turn out to be wrong. Behavioral realism, understood as a
prescriptive theory of judicial decision making, addresses this problem by
proposing that, before judges use lay or "common sense" psychological
theories in their legal analysis, they should take reasonable steps to ensure
that those theories are valid.
We do not mean to suggest that behavioral realism can or should re-
place other jurisprudential principles. As a prescriptive principle of adjudi-
cation, behavioral realism must cohere and coexist with, and sometimes
yield to, other jurisprudential norms. So, for example, even if a statutory
provision was based on erroneous empirical assumptions, if it was textually
unambiguous, its meaning made clear by legislative history and applicable
canons of statutory interpretation, behavioral realism would provide no
warrant for changing it by judicial fiat. The statute's erroneous empirical
premises might provide an argument in favor of its amendment, but that
argument would properly be made to the legislature, not the courts.
We also do not argue here that where a well-established precedent
was based upon a faulty empirical claim, that fact, in and of itself, would
31. David M. O'Brien, The Seduction of the Judiciary: Social Science and the Courts, 64
JUDICATURE 8, 11 (1980).
32. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Intuitive Psychologist Behind the Bench: Models of Gender
Bias in Social Psychology and Employment Discrimination Law, 60 J. Soc. ISSUES 835 (2004).
33. Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution
Process, in COGNITIVE THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 337 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1978).
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justify the precedent's overruling. When considering whether to override
the principle of stare decisis, a court must take numerous considerations
into account, including, among others, whether the existing rule has proven
practically unworkable, the nature and extent of the reliance interests it has
generated, and the costs of an overruling to the Court's perceived legiti-
macy, among others."
Moreover, even the best insights from the empirical social sciences
cannot supply the normative principles needed for substantive lawmaking
or resolve the conflicts between competing norms and interests so often
implicated in the legislative and judicial processes. Law, at root, is norma-
tive. Empiricism, at root, is descriptive, and it must remain so to fulfill its
proper function.
Nonetheless, a place for behavioral realism remains. Statutory terms
and prior judicial precedents sometimes are ambiguous. Precedents often
underdetermine legal outcomes. The common law process leaves substan-
tial room for the judicial elaboration of substantive law. Moreover, even
when the contours of the applicable substantive law are clear, in adjudicat-
ing particular cases, judges are often called upon to draw inferences from
evidence, or to determine whether the inferences a trier of fact might draw
from evidence would be reasonable.
Even conceding that normative legal analysis, and not empiricism,
must supply the fundamental principles with which judges work, once the
law's normative goals have been specified, they must be operationalized
through particular legal doctrines and policies. When those doctrines and
policies are based on faulty models of relevant social phenomena, the law's
ability to advance its normative agenda will be compromised. In short,
when the doctrines and policies designed to operationalize normative legal
principles are premised on empirically testable assumptions about human
social thought or behavior, it is hard to argue with the proposition that in-
sights from the empirical social sciences have an important role to play in
ensuring that those assumptions are sound.
In this Article, we seek to illustrate and advance behavioral realism in
law by applying its methods to the problem of defining and identifying dis-
criminatory motivation in Title VII individual disparate treatment cases.
We begin in Part I by examining the roles that psychological theories play
in law and in empirical social psychology, and by describing the processes
through which each discipline develops and evaluates--or fails to evalu-
ate-the psychological theories it employs. Through this analysis, we hope
to show that the most common objection to behavioral realism in law-
namely, that legal analysis should be based on normative principles rather
than social science theories-is misplaced. Behavioral realism does not
inject social science theories into legal reasoning. It merely provides a clear
34. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992).
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and constructive process for recognizing, evaluating, and, where necessary,
modifying social science theories that are already there.
In Part II, we illustrate how behavioral realism can function as a criti-
cal tool in doctrinal analysis. Specifically, we explore how a behavioral
realist approach can be used to inform the analysis of two hotly disputed
issues in individual disparate treatment doctrine: the same actor inference
and the honest belief rule. Through this analysis, we show specific evi-
dence of the claim we made in Part I-that behavioral realism does not
inject social science theories into legal doctrine. Rather, it simply identifies
and subjects to scrutiny the unexamined social science theories, many of
them plainly invalid, that are already there. Finally, in Part III, we offer a
positive theory of discriminatory motivation, informed both by behavioral
realist methods and by traditional-even conservative-approaches to
statutory interpretation. Through this discussion, we seek to show that, far
from representing a radical innovation, the behavioral realist reading of the
disparate treatment principle we propose is fully consistent with Supreme
Court precedent, textualist methods of statutory interpretation, and princi-
ples of judicial restraint.
I
THEORIES OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN LAW AND EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY
In developing, justifying, and applying the substantive law in any
arena implicating motivation, judgment, or choice, judges frequently em-
ploy theories of human behavior. Both stated and unstated behavioral theo-
ries work their way into the substantive law as judges define ambiguous
terms in statutes or case precedents; as they identify and elaborate upon the
essential elements of proof constituting common law causes of action; as
they develop judicially sanctioned inferences or presumptions; and as they
articulate moral or policy justifications for new or existing legal doctrines.
Empirical social psychology also uses theories of human behavior. In
that discipline, theories are used to explain patterns of experimental obser-
vations and to structure future investigation. However, unlike appellate
judges, who are relatively free to incorporate psychological theories into
their legal analysis without having to establish their validity, psychological
scientists constantly subject their field's theories to empirical scrutiny un-
der consistent and widely agreed-upon methods and evaluative criteria.
This is not the situation in jurisprudence, a field that has yet to develop
well-defined methods and criteria for evaluating the behavioral theories
used in substantive lawmaking. Even in a precedential decision, a judge
who incorporates a particular lay theory of how stereotypes influence so-
cial judgment does not need to show, and probably would never even think
to ask, whether that theory had predictive validity, field validity, or any
validity at all. As we will attempt to demonstrate here, these differences in
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how law and psychological science develop and evaluate behavioral theo-
ries have significant and sometimes negative consequences for law.
Behavioral realism seeks to address these consequences.
A. Behavioral Theories in Law
Law uses theories of human behavior for a number of distinct pur-
poses. Judges use such theories when they interpret the meaning of am-
biguous statutory provisions that implicate human perception, judgment, or
choice. Behavioral theories also figure prominently in the development of
common law theories of liability, as judges identify and elaborate the es-
sential elements of proof and defense that constitute the various common
law crimes and civil causes of action. Behavioral theories work their way
into constitutional law, as well, most notably as judges attempt to justify
established or novel constitutional doctrines. Trial and administrative
judges, litigants, jurors, and dispute handlers also use behavioral theories
when they evaluate or adjudicate specific disputes, as they attempt, for ex-
ample, to attribute causation, assess witness credibility, or determine
whether particular evidentiary facts constitute persuasive circumstantial
evidence of some ultimate fact at issue. And finally, judges, legislators, and
administrative regulators use behavioral theories when they formulate legal
rules in an attempt to structure behavior through individual or organiza-
tional incentives. In the discussion that follows, we elaborate on each of
these uses of behavioral theories in the judicial process.
1. The Use of Behavioral Theories in Statutory Interpretation
When judges are called upon to interpret and apply statutes that bear
on social perception, judgment, and choice, they need theories of human
behavior in order to interpret ambiguous statutory terms and apply them to
particular fact patterns. Judicial explication of terms that connote phenom-
ena implicating cognition, affect, incentives, and choice necessarily rely
upon psychological models of how people go about making sense of them-
selves and others in the social world. Because judges need psychological
theories to interpret statutes, it should come as no great surprise that judges
produce and use those theories, and that the theories either directly or indi-
rectly influence how the law develops over time.
For example, when enacted in 1964, Title VII made discrimination
based on race, color, sex, national origin, or religion unlawful.35 But the
statute nowhere defined what "discrimination" meant. Then, when Con-
gress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it amended Title VII to provide
that actionable discrimination occurred whenever someone's race, color,
sex, national origin, or religion was a "motivating factor" in an
35. Section 703(a)(1), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(I).
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employment decision.36 Here again, Congress did not explain what it meant
by a "motivating factor."
As a result, the courts turned to how they themselves had previously
defined the term. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, a 1989 Supreme Court
decision endorsing the use of "mixed motive" analysis in Title VII dispa-
rate treatment cases, the plurality relied on a "motivating factor" analysis.
In describing for the plurality what it means for gender bias to "motivate" a
challenged employment decision, Justice Brennan wrote:
In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment
decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of
the decision what its reasons were and if we received a truthful
response, one of those reasons would be that the applicant or
employee was a woman.38
This description reflects two "common sense" theories about the na-
ture of discriminatory motivation. In speaking of the decision maker pro-
viding a "truthful" (as opposed to an "accurate") response, this description
reflects an unstated assumption that, when disparate treatment discrimina-
tion occurs, the discriminator is consciously aware, "at the moment of de-
cision,"39 that he or she is discriminating. As Professor Krieger described
in earlier work,4" the implications of which will be extended later in this
article, these two lay psychological theories-the belief in transparent men-
tal processing, and the modeling of perception and decision making as two
discrete processes-have not withstood empirical scrutiny. Decision mak-
ers are often not aware of the impact of a target's social group membership
on their judgments, and those biased judgments are often formed quite
early in the social perception process, long before the moment that a deci-
sion about the target person is made.4'
As this illustration suggests, it is not possible for judges to interpret
what Congress meant when it used the term "discrimination" or the phrase
"motivating factor" in Title VII without applying psychological theories
about how human social perception, motivation, and judgment work-that
is, psychological theories about when people are discriminating and when
they are not.
2. The Use of Psychological Theories in Civil Adjudication
In civil adjudication, judges and other legal actors employ models of
human behavior in the production and justification of abstract legal
36. Section 703(m), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(m).
37. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
38. Id. at 250.
39. Id.
40. Krieger, The Content of Our Categories, supra note 6.
41. See discussion infra pp. 60-62 and notes 146-152.
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doctrines, and in the application of those doctrines to concrete cases. In
either situation, judicial reliance on psychological models may be ex-
pressed directly, or it may function as an unstated, taken-for-granted con-
ception of the various social and psychological phenomena implicated by a
particular area of law.
At least in the Anglo-American system, law seeks to regulate individ-
ual and organizational behavior through the elaboration and application of
doctrinal structures variously referred to as "causes of action," "remedial
theories," or "claims for relief." If a person feels wronged, and desires le-
gal redress for that wrong, she must fit the facts of her case into at least one
legally cognizable claim for relief.
A claim for relief can usefully be understood as a type of schema,
which we might call a "claim schema." Every claim schema comprises a
particular set of narrative and analytical elements. On the narrative side,
each claim schema is associated with a script-a prototypic narrative in
which prototypic characters, acting from prototypic motivations, behave in
prototypic ways with prototypic consequences for a prototypic victim, who
becomes a prototypic claimant. From an advocacy perspective, the narra-
tive resonance of one's case is key to its success. As Anthony Amsterdam
and Jerome Bruner observe, "Law lives on narrative, for reasons both banal
and deep."42
But narrative flow is not all that matters; law has a formal analytical
side as well. In this regard, any claim schema can be parsed into a set of
"essential elements," legal analytic components that must be discemable in
the narrative to form a legally cognizable claim. To establish entitlement to
legal relief, a claimant must introduce admissible evidence sufficient to
establish the existence of each essential element of one or more legally
recognized causes of action.
For example, to establish a right to recover for fraud, a plaintiff must
establish five essential elements constituting the fraud cause of action: 1)
the making of a false or misleading representation to the victim; 2) with
actual or constructive knowledge of its falsity or misleading nature; 3) in-
tent to defraud; and 4) actual reliance on the victim's part, which reliance;
5) redounds to the victim's detriment. 43 To establish a claim for individual
42. ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW: How COURTS RELY ON
STORYTELLING, AND How THEIR STORIES CHANGE THE WAYS WE UNDERSTAND LAW - AND
OURSELVES 110 (2000).
43. The precise articulation of these essential elements differs slightly from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, but they correspond in general substance. So, for example, to establish concealment, fraud,
or misrepresentation, under California law a plaintiff must prove that: 1) the defendant made a
representation as to a past or existing material fact; 2) the representation was false; 3) the defendant
knew that the representation was false when made; 4) the defendant made the representation with an
intent to defraud the plaintiff-with the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to rely on it; 5) the plaintiff
was unaware of the falsity of the representation and acted on the assumed truth of the representation;
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disparate treatment discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must estab-
lish through the introduction of admissible evidence: 1) that he or she is a
member of a protected group; 2) that he or she was subjected to some nega-
tive employment decision; and 3) that his or her protected-group status was
a motivating factor in that decision.44 In either of these examples, and in-
deed in any legal case, a failure of proof on any one of the claim's essential
elements results in a judgment for the defendant.45
Lay psychological theories necessarily find their way into law at the
level of doctrinal construction as courts define and describe the essential
elements of proof and defense constituting legally cognizable crimes or
civil claims for relief. For example, theories of intentionality figure cen-
trally in the substantive criminal law, where crimes are defined largely by
the subjective state of mind with which a particular act was performed. In
this regard, for example, recklessness is distinguished from intent, and
mere intent from intent with malice aforethought. Criminal adjudication
requires the trier of fact to discern, usually through the drawing of infer-
ences from circumstantial evidence, the subjective state of mind with
which the crime's actus reus was performed. For this reason, criminal legal
doctrine necessarily reflects and reifies a particular theory of the mind. So,
too, with respect to the law of torts, where the same act and resulting harm
is accorded profoundly different legal significance according to the state of
mind with which an ultimately harmful act is performed, from mere
thoughtlessness to malicious injurious purpose.
The incorporation of a particular essential element into a crime or
civil cause of action may in and of itself reflect an implicit psychological
theory. For example, we assume (and we do not mean to suggest that this
assumption is incorrect), that intent to kill is practically as well as theoreti-
cally distinguishable from malice aforethought. The substantive law of
fraud implicitly assumes that "knowledge of falsity" is psychologically
distinct and empirically distinguishable from the spontaneous, subjective
construal of ambiguous information in a self-serving manner, a well-
documented cognitive process that often occurs outside of conscious
awareness.
46
Of course, this pattern also holds for civil claims derived from statutes
or constitutional provisions. For example, in both statutory and
and 6) as a result of relying on the representation, the plaintiff sustained damages. See BERNARD E.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW §§ 676-677, 778-79 (9th ed. 1988).
44. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100 (2003).
45. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., § 2727 10A
(3d ed. 1998).
46. For an excellent treatment of this and related phenomena, and their implications for the law
of securities fraud, see Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
Corporations Mislead Stock Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 139-
48(1997).
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constitutional antidiscrimination law, the distinction between disparate
treatment theory and disparate impact theory inherently relies on the as-
sumption that the "intent to discriminate" required to establish a disparate
treatment claim is psychologically distinct and practically distinguishable
from the mindless indifference to harms inflicted on an outgroup by fa-
cially neutral policies.
In most cases, it is not merely the evidence placed into the record that
establishes or disestablishes an essential element of the particular claim for
relief for which it was offered. Rather, in most situations, the essential
elements of a litigant's case are proven (or not) through the presentation of
numerous evidentiary facts, which, combined with inferences reasonably
drawn from those evidentiary facts, either do or do not establish the exis-
tence of each essential element by a preponderance of the evidence.47
In the adjudication of summary judgment motions, judges use implicit
theories of human behavior to determine, among other things, what infer-
ences would be "reasonable" or "unreasonable" to draw from a particular
factual pattern, since only "reasonable" inferences need be drawn in favor
of the non-moving party (usually the plaintiff) and against the moving
party (usually the defendant).4"
Assuming that a case survives summary judgment and gets to trial,
jurors then need theories of human behavior to know which of various
competing "reasonable" inferences should be drawn from the facts adduced
in evidence. In most cases, proof is circumstantial; inferences form a kind
of logical bridge between the evidentiary facts adduced in evidence and the
ultimate facts that must be established or disestablished for one or the other
litigant to prevail.
Obviously, in cases involving social interaction, one's implicit or ex-
plicit theories of human and organizational behavior will play a central role
in drawing inferences from facts, and in determining whether those infer-
ences are reasonable. Generally speaking, people view particular inferences
as relatively more reasonable, and are more likely to draw them, if such
inferences comport with their subjective understanding of the common na-
ture of things in the world. For this reason, in any lawsuit involving human
social interaction, judgment, or choice, both judge and jury act as "intuitive
psychologists,"49 bringing to bear on the unfolding case narrative their im-
plicitly held theories of human behavior.
47. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 592 (1986)
(qualifying the well-settled rule that, on summary judgment, all inferences must be drawn in favor of
the nonmoving party with the principle that such inferences must be reasonable).
48. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
49. See Ross, supra note 33, at 337.
CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
3. Behavioral Theories and Moral Authority in Constitutional
Interpretation
In constitutional lawmaking, judges sometimes use psychological
theories to justify decisions based on independent normative grounds. In
this regard, consider the "separate but equal" principle pronounced in
Plessy v. Ferguson5" and repudiated fifty-six years later in Brown v. Board
of Education.5 As described in this Article's introduction, many commen-
tators criticized the Warren Court's use of social science evidence in its
decision in Brown. But for the most part, these critics fail to acknowledge
that Plessy used social science, too.
The Plessy Court's interpretation of the equal-protection mandate was
analytically based on and rhetorically justified by the essentially psycho-
logical claim that laws relegating Blacks to separate public accommoda-
tions could effectuate equality, not simply as a legal conclusion, but also in
terms of the lived experience of the Black citizens whose lives these laws
affected. Specifically, Justice Brown wrote for the Plessy majority that
state enforced separation of the races stamps Blacks with a badge of inferi-
ority only "because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon
it."52 This statement asserted an essentially empirical claim-that the social
and personal meaning of Jim Crow, and hence its effect on an individual
Black person's psyche, was simply a product of subjective interpretation
that could easily be transformed into something psychologically benign
through the exercise of individual or collective cognitive free will.
Fifty-six years later, in Brown, the Court reversed course on both the
law and the psychology of state-sanctioned segregation. Relying in part on
empirical research by Dr. Kenneth Clark and other social scientists, the
Brown Court concluded, "To separate [Black children] from others of simi-
lar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."53
50. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
51. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
52. Justice Brown stated in Plessy:
Laws permitting, and even requiring, [the] separation [of the races] in places where they are
liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the
other .... We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiffs argument to consist in the
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge
of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because
the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544, 551 (1896).
53. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). The Court in Brown went on to quote a
finding by the district court that:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the
colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of
separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A
sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of
law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro
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As this passage suggests, the Brown Court's interpretation of the
equal protection mandate was based on and justified by an empirically test-
able claim about the psychological effects of segregation on Black chil-
dren. 4 The social science research described in Brown's footnote eleven
functioned to justify not only the Court's decision on the merits, but also
its departure from the principle of stare decisis, as Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor noted in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey.55 The logic of Brown suggests that advances in empirical social
psychology not only allowed but even compelled the Court to repudiate the
separate but equal doctrine, on the grounds that the psychology relied upon
by the Plessy majority had been not only publicly repudiated but also em-
pirically invalidated.
Brown v. Board of Education is, of course, not the only Fourteenth
Amendment case in which the Supreme Court invoked social science theo-
ries to justify its decision. Almost fifty years earlier, in Muller v. Oregon,56
the Court upheld an Oregon law restricting the daily number of hours
women could work, basing its decision in part on the contents of the origi-
nal "Brandeis brief," which surveyed medical and social science theories
about the effect of long working hours on women's physical and mental
health.57 More recently, social science theories reported in the amicus con-
tributions of organizations such as the American Psychological Association
and the American Sociological Association were used by the Supreme
Court majorities and minorities in the Michigan affirmative action cases of
Gratz v. Bollinger5 and Grutter v. Bollinger.59
children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly]
integrated school system.
Id. at 494.
54. We are aware that the question of whether the Warren Court was, in fact, influenced by the
results of Kenneth Clark's doll study and other social science research concerning the effects of
segregation on Black children is contested. Compare, e.g., Sanjay Mody, Brown Footnote Eleven in
Historical Context: Social Science and the Supreme Court's Quest for Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REV.
793 (2002) (arguing against the claim) with Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual
Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535 (1998) (arguing in favor of the claim). See generally JUAN
WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 197-205 (1998) (describing NAACP's
decision to submit psychologist Kenneth Clark's "doll study" as evidence of segregation's harmful
effect on black children); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED
EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987) (describing early stages of litigation that led to the 1954 decision in
Brown); HERBERT HILL & JACK GREENBERG, CITIZEN'S GUIDE To DESEGREGATION: A STUDY OF
SOCIAL AND LEGAL CHANGE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1955) (describing in Chapters 7 and 8 the pre-1954
stages of the Brown litigation).
55. 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992).
56. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
57. For a discussion of the use of social science evidence in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908), see John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 480-82 (1986).
58. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
59. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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In each of these three instances, social science was arguably used to
justify the Court's choice of a legal rule based on independent normative
grounds. In Muller, insights from the medical and social sciences were
used to bolster the Court's decision that the Oregon law restricting
women's, but not men's, working hours was rational. In Brown, social sci-
ence findings relating to the psychological effects of segregation on Black
children were used to legitimate the Court's repudiation of Plessy v.
Ferguson and the "separate but equal" doctrine it embraced. And, in Gratz
and Grutter, the Court's minority and majority opinions, respectively,
based their qualified defense of preferential forms of affirmative action on
a set of essentially empirical claims about the effect of student body diver-
sity on educational quality. Reading any of three of these cases, one could
easily be left with the troubling sense that the Court had used the normaliz-
ing power of science to airbrush away the sharp edges of a difficult and
divisive normative choice.
We return in our conclusion to problems stemming from the misuse of
social science in substantive lawmaking. For present purposes, however,
this counterpoint is key: those who criticize the use of insights from the
empirical social sciences in constitutional lawmaking often fail to recog-
nize that the alternative to empiricism is often bare judicial surmise, posing
as common sense, and having a lesser claim to validity than the imperfect
science such critics would exclude from the legal analytical process.
4. The Use of Behavioral Theories in the Shaping of Legal Incentives
Two of the core insights of the law and economics movement are that
people respond to incentives and that law can serve as a powerful tool for
structuring those incentives in socially beneficial ways.6" It is testimony to
the enormous success of this movement that legal rules are increasingly
crafted with an eye toward structuring incentives so as to encourage people
and organizations to act in particular ways and forbear from acting in oth-
ers. Indeed, one finds all across the legal landscape the shaping of statutes,
regulations, and judicial interpretations of statutes and regulations in ways
explicitly designed to encourage desirable behaviors and discourage unde-
sirable ones within a particular compliance community.6
When judges craft legal rules to shape incentives and thereby further
the law's normative goals, they necessarily draw upon theoretical models
of individual and organizational motivation and behavior. Sometimes the
models on which judges draw are simply assumed to be accurate, even
60. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1054 (2000).
61. By "compliance community" we mean those individuals and entities that are either
responsible for complying with a particular legal regime or entitled to its protection.
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though they represent testable theories that have been subjected to scrutiny
in the empirical social sciences.
In the antidiscrimination law context, the legal doctrine governing
employer liability for sexual harassment by supervisors illustrates how
judges sometimes use unexamined, often even unstated, behavioral theories
when they craft legal rules with an eye toward structuring individual and
organizational incentives. For example, in two cases decided in 1998,
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton6" and Burlington Industries v. Ellerth,63 the
Supreme Court established an affirmative defense to Title VII claims of
hostile work environment harassment by supervisors. The defense permits
an employer to defeat an otherwise meritorious hostile environment har-
assment claim if it can show that it had promulgated antiharassment poli-
cies and instituted antiharassment education and grievance procedures, and
that the plaintiff had failed to use those procedures early in an escalating
sequence of harassing events.'
Writing for the Faragher majority, Justice Souter acknowledged that
the Court's decision to establish the affirmative defense deviated from a
long line of cases applying agency principles to hold employers responsible
for tortious conduct by their supervisory employees.6" Justice Souter justi-
fied this departure, however, on utilitarian grounds. By providing employ-
ers with incentives to institute antiharassment policies, education programs,
and grievance procedures, and by encouraging employees to complain
early in an escalating sequence of harassing events, the new affirmative
defense would serve Title VII's "primary objective," which Justice Souter
described as "not to provide redress but to avoid harm."66 As various com-
mentators have noted,67 the Court's reasoning in Faragher reflects and
62. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
63. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
64. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764-65.
65. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804.
66. Id. at 806.
67. See, e.g., THERESA M. BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES: USING SOCIAL
SCIENCE TO REFORMULATE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW (2005) (reviewing social science evidence
regarding patterns of women's response to unwanted sexualized workplace conduct); Anne Lawton,
Tipping the Scales of Justice in Sexual Harassment Law, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 517 (2001) (examining
social-science evidence bearing on the utility of internal grievance procedures in preventing or
remedying sexual harassment); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment-
Normative, Descriptive, and Doctrinal Interactions: A Reply to Professors Beiner and Bisom-Rapp, 24
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 169 (2001) [hereinafter Krieger, Employer Liability for Sexual
Harassment] (using social-science evidence to question the assumption implicit in Supreme Court
harassment doctrine that "reasonable" women who are exposed to unwelcome sexualized conduct in the
workplace will file internal complaints with their employers early in an escalating sequence of
harassing incidents); Susan Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers: The Questionable
Embrace of Employee Sexual Harassment Training by the Legal Profession, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L. REV. 147 (2001) (commenting on the dearth of social science evidence supporting the Supreme
Court's assumptions that antiharassment policies, training programs, and grievance procedures actually
prevent harassment from occurring).
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relies upon a particular set of unstated and unexamined, but empirically
testable, assumptions. First, the Court assumes that by promulgating poli-
cies against harassment and by establishing antiharassment education and
grievance procedures, employers will prevent harassment from occurring,
or will, at the very least, significantly decrease its incidence. Second, the
Court's analysis rests on the premise that employees who are subjected to
unwelcome sexualized workplace conduct will use an employer-run griev-
ance procedure if one is provided, and that they will do so before the con-
duct becomes egregious.
However, as numerous commentators have documented, virtually no
empirical support exists for the proposition that antiharassment policies,
training programs, or internal grievance procedures actually reduce the
amount of unwanted sexualized conduct in the workplace.68 Moreover, a
large amount of empirical evidence indicates that reporting through exist-
ing internal grievance mechanisms is an extremely rare response to un-
wanted sexualized workplace conduct, and that women generally have
quite reasonable justifications for their decision not to report.69 In other
words, in their efforts to use the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense to
structure incentives and ultimately prevent harassment from occurring, the
justices appear to have presumed a behavioral world that does not in fact
exist.
If sexual harassment doctrine is premised on the essentially empirical
claim that antiharassment policies, training, and grievance procedures re-
duce harassment, or that "reasonable" women will use those procedures
early in an escalating sequence of harassing events, and if these claims are
empirically false, the justices' attempt to deploy the Faragher/Ellerth af-
firmative defense to prevent harassment from occurring will fail to achieve
its policy objectives. Rather than preventing harassment from occurring,
the affirmative defense will simply operate to defeat otherwise meritorious
harassment claims.
It is significant to note how, in Faragher and Ellerth, the Court sim-
ply takes as given that employer antiharassment policies and procedures
will reduce the incidence and severity of harassment. The Court's com-
mitment to this "common sense" view deepened in 1999, when in Kolstad
v. American Dental Association,7" the Court established an affirmative
68. BEINER, supra note 67; Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph
of Form Over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 3 (2003); Bisom-Rapp,
Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers, supra note 67; Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention is a Poor
Substitute for a Pound of Cure, supra note 21; Theresa M. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social
Knowledge: The Implications of Social Science Research on Imputing Liability to Employers for Sexual
Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273 (2000); Krieger, Employer Liability for Sexual
Harassment, supra note 67.
69. See sources cited supra note 68.
70. 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
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defense against Title VII claims for punitive damages similar to the de-
fense it established in the sexual harassment context. Under this affirmative
defense, employers can avoid liability for punitive damages by promulgat-
ing antidiscrimination policies and attempting to educate their employees
about Title VII's prescriptions.7 Writing for the Kolstad majority, Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor echoed Justice Souter's statement in Faragher that
Title VII's primary objective was not to provide redress, but to prevent
harm. 2 For that reason, she continued, the purposes underlying Title VII
are advanced when employers are encouraged to adopt formal antidis-
crimination policies and inform their employees about antidiscrimination
laws. The affirmative defense will provide incentives for employers to
adopt antidiscrimination policies and training programs, and this, the Court
reasoned, will reduce the incidence of discrimination, thus furthering Title
VII's goals.
Throughout the Court's analysis in Kolstad, as in Faragher and
Ellerth, the Court simply assumes that antidiscrimination policies and
training programs reduce the incidence of discrimination. There is virtually
no empirical evidence, however, to support this claim. In fact, there is
some evidence suggesting exactly the opposite.7"
Of course, apart from judicial attempts to engineer incentives, legal
rules can be devised to serve other functions about which empiricism has
little if anything to say. So, for example, the Court could have premised the
Faragher/Ellerth defense on the notion that it would be unfair to impose
liability on a corporation that is trying, however imperfectly, to ensure that
its employees comply with the ambiguous and often conflicting set of legal
and practical considerations that sexual-harassment law implicates. Alter-
nately, the Court might have based the defense on the grounds that, as a
matter of judicial economy, if an employer provides an internal grievance
mechanism for redressing harassment claims and if an allegedly aggrieved
employee has failed to use it, she should not be allowed to seek redress
from the already overburdened federal court system. In other words, legal
doctrines can be, and often are, premised on normative principles about
which, in the final analysis, empirical research has little to say.
For example, were it empirically established that state-sanctioned seg-
regation does not injure Black children's self-esteem, would we want to
reverse Brown? How many supporters of preferential forms of affirmative
action would change their views as to its constitutionality if it were estab-
lished that student body diversity had no discernable effects on educational
71. See id. at 545-46.
72. Id. at 545.
73. See, e.g., Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers, supra note 67 (reviewing
available research record and concluding that little if any evidence supports the proposition that
antidiscrimination policies and training programs actually reduce the incidence of discrimination or
harassment).
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outcomes? As these questions illustrate, empiricism is no substitute for
normative analysis.
However, empiricism is indispensable to sound consequential analy-
sis. Obviously, a legal rule can effectively shape conduct through the struc-
turing of individual or organizational incentives only if that rule is built
upon accurate models of individual and organizational behavior and
choice. When judges premise legal doctrines on the notion that a particular
legal rule will structure individual and organizational incentives and
thereby shape behavior in a particular way, they need to get the social sci-
ence right. Although far from infallible, psychological science often serves
as a better source of such models than "common sense" or other forms of a
priori theorizing.
B. Behavioral Theories in Cognitive Social Psychology
What then does it mean to "get the science right"? How do social-
scientific communities go about evaluating the theories that structure their
investigations, and what, if anything, can jurisprudence learn from science
about its own relationship to the psychological theories it generates and
employs?
When creating or updating behavioral theories, psychological science
employs a wholly empirical standard of proof. Normative analysis has no
role to play in determining whether a behavioral theory is sound. In psy-
chological science, investigations proceed from hypotheses, which state the
expected relationship between two or more variables.74 Usually, causality is
stated (A increases B) or strongly implied (A and B go together, and A is
temporally prior). Hypotheses most often derive from theories supported
by basic research (i.e., research concerned with fundamental principles
rather than with the application of those fundamental principles to a spe-
cific applied problem). 75 Scientists share criteria for what makes good the-
ory. These criteria include causality, coherence, parsimony, and
falsifiability.
76
Questions about causation occupy most scientific research, and social
science is no exception. Well-established empirical standards for causal
inference require that: (a) two variables be associated (co-vary; change to-
gether over time, occasions, or persons); (b) the proposed cause temporally
precede the proposed effect; (c) the relationship is not spurious (i.e., in re-
ality jointly caused by a third variable); and (d) a rationale be argued." The
74. SUSAN T. FISKE, SOCIAL BEINGS: A CORE MOTIVES APPROACH TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 40
(2004).
75. Id. at 38.
76. Id. at 38-39.
77. Id. at 60-61.
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following discussion will briefly elaborate on each one of these require-
ments.
To meet these standards, an individual conducting an experiment-the
gold standard for inferring causality-would first show temporal priority
by manipulating experimental conditions and measuring the result. Next,
she would establish association by measuring the result at different values
of the putative cause. She would also demonstrate nonspuriousness by hav-
ing randomly assigned subjects to different conditions and having con-
trolled for extraneous variables. Finally, theory would provide the rationale
by explaining mechanisms linked to a network of other theories and obser-
vations. Without theory, empirical observations would merely collect a
series of isolated facts without larger meaning.
In addition to inferring causality, a good theory possesses coherence.
It must not contradict itself. It must reflect internal logic, and it must tell a
plausible story.
Good theories are also parsimonious. So long as accuracy is not com-
promised, explaining a phenomenon with a few measurable variables is
preferable to explaining it with many. Unfortunately, nature does not al-
ways cooperate. Elegance makes theories more esthetically pleasing, and
more testable, but it may not make them more accurate. Neoclassical eco-
nomics provides a salient example. Economic theories based on the ra-
tional-actor assumption are elegant and parsimonious, but as research in
behavioral economics has shown, they do not accurately predict much of
human economic behavior.78
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, to be legitimate a social scien-
tific theory must be falsifiable. The central criterion for falsification is that
observations, made under suitably controlled conditions, can contradict the
theory being tested. Enough of these observations, replicated over time and
investigator, topple the theory, and new contenders emerge. 9
The evidence for and against any previously accepted social-scientific
theory is subject to rigorous peer review. As a rule, scientists are conserva-
tive and resist new approaches, holding their colleagues to very high stan-
dards. New theoretical models that survive this process are then themselves
subjected to attempts at falsification.
Thus, theories in psychological science are inherently destined to
evolve. Current theories explain the body of observations to date, and new
variants incorporate the older observations as well as new ones. The body
of data remains constant, though its interpretation shifts as it is viewed
through the lenses of evolving theories. That psychological theories change
does not make them arbitrary; they must withstand scrutiny under the best
methods and data available at the time.
78. See generally ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2004).
79. KUHN, supra note 3.
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C. Quality Control:
Incorporating Psychological Theories into Legal Doctrines
Given the relative impermanence of psychological theories, what
standards should govern their incorporation into law? This question, or at
least one much like it, occupies an entire field of law and scholarship on
the admissibility of expert testimony, and we do not intend to review or
add directly to that literature here. A set of basic principles, however, bear
mention.
At a minimum, as suggested by the Supreme Court's decision in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,"0 the law should not incorporate
a psychological theory into one of its many doctrines unless it has been
empirically tested, has been subject to peer review and publication, has
garnered widespread acceptance within the relevant scientific community,
and, where applicable, has a known and acceptable error rate.8 In connec-
tion with factual adjudication, a trial court, applying Daubert, plays a gate-
keeping role; it screens proffered scientific evidence to determine whether
it satisfies applicable scientific standards, and whether it would be useful to
the trier of fact.
Social science models must clear an additional hurdle before use in
adjudication. Psychological science is basic research, often conducted in
the laboratory. Meanwhile, legal disputes concern events in the real world.
As such, questions of "external" or "field" validity inevitably arise.82 The
challenge often takes this form: does the experimental result pertain only to
the rarefied, highly controlled, artificial context of the laboratory, or does it
also accurately represent how things work in the real world?
A theory might have laboratory but not field validity for a number of
reasons. First, by controlling for extraneous factors, a well-designed ex-
periment might amplify an effect that outside the laboratory is dominated
by the very factors being controlled. Second, a laboratory finding may be
statistically significant at the 0.01 or 0.05 level even when the actual effect
size is relatively small.83 Third, the dependent variable measured in a
80. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
81. Id. at 593-94. Daubert frames the critical issue as one involving the relevant theory's
"reliability." The word choice is somewhat unfortunate. Within scientific communities, "reliability"
refers to the consistency with which a researcher can make a particular experimental observation. A
theory's accuracy or soundness, on the other hand, goes to the issue of its validity. Validity was the
concern in Daubert.
82. FISKE, supra note 74, at 68.
83. An observed difference or relationship among variables is said to be "statistically significant"
if the odds of that difference or relationship occurring by chance are less than 5% (in which case it is
significant at the .05 level) or less than 1% (in which case it is significant at the .01 level). The term
"effect size" is used to indicate the practical extent of the difference on some characteristic of interest
between the experimental and control groups in a controlled experiment. MARY B. HARRIS, BASIC
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laboratory demonstration of a particular effect may differ from the actual
real world behavior it was designed to simulate.
Using primary research in psychological science implicates all of
these issues, but tools exist to reckon with them. Effect sizes can be meas-
ured and expressed as a standardized statistical unit.84 Researchers can use
representative-sample survey and field observations to assess the field va-
lidity of a theory validated in the laboratory environment.
Individuals who question the field validity of laboratory demonstra-
tions often base their criticisms on a questionable assumption. These indi-
viduals assume that by removing most sources of noise, the laboratory
setting increases rather than decreases the strength of the studied phenome-
non's signal. This assumption flatters social science by likening it to the
field of pure physics, comparing a reduced-noise psychology experiment
with a frictionless vacuum. But people are not particles, and the noise in a
social system tends to conform to other noise in the system. Fortunately,
through the use of meta-analysis, which allows the quantitative summary
of results across multiple studies, social scientists can sometimes identify
field effects that are larger than their laboratory-bound counterparts.
Several such meta-analyses have been done on phenomena pertaining
to prejudice and discrimination. Stronger field than laboratory effects have
demonstrated the real world generality of favoring members of one's in-
group,85 remembering stereotypic more than counterstereotypic informa-
tion,86judging the outgroup as more homogeneous than the ingroup, 7 and
liking people one sees frequently.88
In short, psychological science provides effective mechanisms not
only for testing the laboratory validity of psychological theories, but also
for determining whether those theories accurately represent effects that
occur with meaningful frequency in the real world. And even where only a
few studies demonstrating field validity exist, it is hard to understand why
judge's a priori psychological intuitions, which have no demonstrated va-
lidity at all, should be preferred to psychological theories validated by
84. One statistical technique used to express effect size is the Cohen's d, which equals the
difference between the means of the experimental and control groups divided by the standard deviation
of the control group. See generally, Jacob Cohen, Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral
Sciences (1988)(describing the importance of reporting effect sizes in social science research and
proposing a specific test, now known as "Cohen's d," for expressing effect size as a standard measure).
85. Brian Mullen, Rupert Brown & Colleen Smith, Ingroup Bias as a Function of Salience,
Relevance, and Status: An Integration, 22 EUR. J. OF Soc. PSYCHOL. 103 (1992).
86. Charles Stangor & David McMillan, Memory for Expectancy-Congruent and Expectancy-
Incongruent Information: A Review of the Social and Social Developmental Literatures, Ill PSYCHOL.
BULL. 42 (1992).
87. Thomas M. Ostrom & Constantine Sedikides, Out-Group Homogeneity Effects in Natural
andMinimal Groups, 112 PSYCHOL. BULL. 536 (1992).
88. See Robert F. Bornstein, Exposure and Affect: Overview and Meta-Analysis of Research,
1968-1987, 106 PSYCHOL. BULL 265 (1989) (noting the extensive research that shows that repeated
exposure leads to an "increase in positive affect" to a particular stimulus).
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solid, laboratory-based science. As we noted above, Daubert stands for the
proposition that adjudicative facts should not be based on a psychological
theory unless that theory has been empirically tested, subjected to peer re-
view and publication, has garnered widespread acceptance within the rele-
vant scientific community, and, where applicable, has a known and
acceptable error rate. But, as we have shown and will demonstrate in
greater detail in Part II, in elaborating legal doctrines and in applying them
in legal reasoning, judges routinely articulate and apply intuitive psycho-
logical theories that satisfy none of these normative criteria. And once in-
corporated into legal doctrine, these lay psychological theories can be quite
difficult to modify or uproot.
D. Modifying Behavioral Theories in Law:
When is Theory Change Needed, and Why Is It So Hard to Effect?
As we have shown, as judges develop, interpret, explain, and apply
legal rules, they necessarily construct and draw upon models of human be-
havior they assume to be empirically sound. They do this in a number of
ways: by incorporating certain essential elements of proof into the claims
for relief they recognize as legally cognizable; by the language they use to
explain why, in any particular case, those elements have or have not been
established; by their crafting of jury instructions; and through their defini-
tion of ambiguous statutory terms. Judges make assumptions about human
behavior in their evidentiary rulings and in their written opinions granting
or denying summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law. Sometimes
records of judicial reasoning explicitly posit these theories of human be-
havior, and sometimes they do not. Either way, because law's legitimacy is
based on the appearance of stability, continuity, and fidelity to precedent,
the judiciary faces high costs when it questions or changes the implicit
psychology behind established legal doctrines. The kind of course correc-
tion taken in Brown v. Board of Education can happen only so often if the
judiciary is to preserve rule-of-law notions and popular legitimacy.
Litigants, like judges, have little incentive to question the inferential
architecture undergirding the substantive legal theories on which their
claims or defenses are premised. Although civil litigation is in many ways
highly technical, at the end of the day, lawsuits tell stories. Because judicial
opinions incorporate popular, taken-for-granted assumptions about the
common nature of things, they function as a society's core stories; they
offer an interpretation of experience and provide the participants of future
lawsuits a narrative comprising a set of easily recognized plots, symbols,
themes, and characters.89
89. See generally AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 42 (describing the roles of psychological
processes including categorization, narrative pattern recognition, and rhetorical cultural resonance in
legal advocacy and judicial decision making).
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Future litigators fall hostage to these narratives. As the narratives be-
come paradigms-as they become entrenched in legal doctrine-litigators
have an irresistible incentive to construct from the facts of their client's
particular case a story that closely resembles them. Challenging the law's
implicit, phenomenological metatheories is a good way for a lawyer to lose
her client's case. In short, whether one is a judge or a litigant, legal institu-
tions structure incentives in ways that protect the implicit theories of hu-
man behavior underpinning established legal doctrines from challenge or
change.
On the other hand, as the last section described, empirical psychology
has a very different relationship to its theories of human behavior. Empiri-
cal social science progresses by testing, problematizing, refining, supple-
menting, and sometimes disconfirming, established theories of human
perception, judgment, behavior, and choice. Social psychology is interest-
ing because it produces vivid, replicable demonstrations of how human
beings tend to behave in particular contexts. These demonstrations are use-
ful because they often sharply contradict our "common sense" theories of
human behavior, including those embedded in law.
Empirical social psychologists, unlike judges and litigants, have pow-
erful incentives to challenge the established theoretical models that consti-
tute their discipline. In a very real sense, empirical psychology develops
theories of human behavior as scaffolding for further investigation, which,
if successful, conduces over time to the theory's modification. In empirical
psychology, as in all science, theory emendation represents success. In ju-
risprudence, on the other hand, theory change, unaccompanied by legisla-
tion or constitutional amendment, threatens subjective conceptions of
judicial legitimacy. For this reason, once a particular model of human be-
havior becomes embedded in legal doctrine, judges may go to great lengths
to avoid having to modify it. As a result, in terms of their accuracy and
comprehensiveness, empirically tested psychological theories tend to get
ahead of their judicial counterparts.
Numerous examples of this lag between psychological and jurispru-
dential theories of the same phenomenon come readily to mind. Together,
they reveal the critical need for the law to find more effective mechanisms
for examining, and where indicated, changing, the behavioral theories it
employees. Eyewitness identification testimony, for example, has retained
its judicial imprimatur of singular probative value long after empirical so-
cial scientists vividly demonstrated its frightful unreliability.9" Cases in-
volving repressed memories continue to circumvent otherwise applicable
statutes of limitations, despite research by Elizabeth Loftus and others cast-
ing the syndrome's very existence as a genuine phenomenon into serious
90. See generally ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (2d ed. 1996) (summarizing
the body of work on the unreliability of eyewitness testimony).
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doubt.91 And courts continue to admit as evidence expert testimony pur-
porting to predict future violence in convicted murderers92 in death penalty
cases, despite the work of psychologists like John Monahan, Robert
Menzies, and others, who have demonstrated that in most contexts such
predictions have little, if any, validity.93
Where social science does influence legal doctrine, the lag-time be-
tween scientific and legal acceptance appears to be at least five years. In
one respect this lag serves a useful purpose; it allows scientific consensus
to solidify, and it inhibits the overeager adoption of fads and flukes. In an-
other respect, however, the five-year lag poses a problem if the alternative
is not older science but flawed common sense theories of behavior. Un-
validated intuitions are often a poor substitute for science, even five-year-
old science.
Nowhere, we suggest, have the intuitive psychological theories em-
ployed by judges in the elaboration of legal doctrine and the adjudication
of individual cases fallen further behind their empirically vetted social sci-
ence counterparts than in the context of antidiscrimination law. In virtually
every way that judges presiding over civil rights cases employ implicit
psychological theories-in the construction of legally cognizable claims
for relief; the schematic abstraction and description of those claims' con-
stituent elements in judicial opinions; the analysis of factual records in
connection with summary adjudication motions; the analysis of motions for
judgment as a matter of law; the crafting of jury instruction; and substan-
tial-evidence review on appeal-antidiscrimination doctrine lags far behind
the psychological science of intergroup bias.
In other words, current judicial models of what discrimination is, what
causes it to occur, and how one should go about determining whether it
happened in any given case, now diverge in significant ways from the
models of intergroup bias validated through empirical inquiry in the social
sciences. Furthermore, although from time to time apparent doctrinal in-
roads have been made, antidiscrimination jurisprudence has in many re-
spects proven stubbornly refractory to the conceptual adjustments the
91. See generally ELIZABETH LoFTus & KATHERINE KETCHAM, THE MYTH OF REPRESSED
MEMORY (1994) (questioning the scientific validity of repressed memories); Timothy D. Wilson &
Elizabeth W. Dunn, Self-Knowledge: Its Limits, Value, and Potential for Improvement, 55 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 493, 497-98 (2004) (reviewing more current research on memory suppression).
92. This principle derives from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463
U.S. 880, 901-03 (1983), which is still good law.
93. See generally John Monahan, The Scientific Status of Research on Clinical and Actuarial
Predictions of Violence, in DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 423 (2d ed. 2002); Robert Menzies et al., The Dimensions of
Dangerousness Revisited: Assessing Forensic Predictions About Violence, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1
(1994); David Faust & Jay Ziskin, The Expert Witness in Psychology and Psychiatry, 241 SCl. 31
(1988).
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science of implicit bias suggests it needs. We now turn our attention to that
subject.
II
A BEHAVIORAL REALIST CRITIQUE OF DISPARATE TREATMENT DOCTRINE
The past thirty years of empirical research in social psychology have
yielded four fundamental insights of central importance to antidiscrimina-
tion law and to theories of proof in discrimination cases. The first concerns
the relative roles of controlled and automatic processes in human judgment
and choice. Far more appears to go on in the cognitive background, beyond
the perceiver's conscious attentional focus, than naive theories of human
behavior suggest. In other words, much of what we do is "mindless,"94 pro-
ceeding on automatic pilot.95
The second principle concerns the importance of subjective construal
in shaping human judgment and behavior. Recent research has shown that
raw perceptual input does not, on its own, shape impression formation,
memory, or eventual choice. Rather, perceptual input is rendered meaning-
ful only through a process of subjective construal.96 Construal is subject to
a variety of distortions stemming from implicit schematic expectancies,
including but not limited to social stereotypes. This biased construal is not
unique to intergroup perception. Social perception and judgment more gen-
erally are subject to numerous biases, which often impair people's ability
to accurately predict the future, attribute causation, and otherwise under-
stand the social world in which they act, judge, and choose. Frequently, as
the first principle suggests, these biases may operate outside of the per-
ceiver's conscious, attentional focus. Often, they can be controlled only
through the application of effortful, deliberate, cognitive "correction."97
Social psychology's third important principle taps into the importance
of belonging98 to one's primary social groups. People demonstrably con-
form to their social surroundings far more than they think they would.99
94. ELLEN J. LANGER, MINDFULNESS (1989).
95. John A. Bargh, The Automaticity of Everyday Life, in 10 ADVANCES IN SOCIAL COGNITION I
(Robert S. Wyer, Jr. ed., 1997).
96. See LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 59-89 (1991); Jerome S. Bruner, On Perceptual Readiness, 64 PSYCHOL. REV.
123, 123-27 (1957); Lee Ross & Donna Shestowsky, Contemporary Psychology's Challenges to Legal
Theory and Practice, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1081, 1088 (2003).
97. See Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental
Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 130
(1994). See generally, SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION (2d Edition, 1991)
(describing social construal and correction processes in social perception).
98. Roy F. Baumeister & Mark R. Leary, The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal
Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 497, 497 (1995).
99. See generally Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: I. A Minority of
One Against a Unanimous Majority, in 70 PSYCHOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS: GENERAL AND APPLIED I
(Herbert S. Conrad ed., 1956).
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
This finding holds across cultures and over time. l00 The importance of un-
derstanding people as social beings'0 1 permeates all of social psychology.
This follows from the fact that people have never survived well outside of
primary groups. Due to this core social motive to get along with and feel
accepted by one's group, most people attune their behavior to the thinking
and feelings of those around them more than introspection would admit.
Social context has an enormous impact on individual behavior.
This leads into the fourth key principle emerging from empirical so-
cial psychology-the surprising power of situations, as opposed to assum-
edly stable, dispositional traits or tastes, in shaping judgment, behavior,
and choice. Empirical investigations in social psychology have shown that
by varying even minor aspects of the situation in which people are asked to
judge, act, or choose, one can elicit completely different patterns of behav-
ior, even if nothing about the actor's self-interest has been changed.
Situational variables, as contrasted with stable dispositional traits or
"tastes," have far more power in shaping preferences and in driving social
behavior than most people assume.'02
These four principles-the important role played by the cognitive un-
conscious in social perception and judgment; the centrality of subjective
construal; the motivational power of belonging; and the power of situa-
tions-function together as the weight-bearing pillars of modem social
psychology. Significantly, they all directly challenge the "intuitive
psychology" underpinning much of currently accepted federal antidis-
crimination doctrine. In numerous ways, antidiscrimination law reflects
and reifies a common-sense theory of social perception and judgment that
attributes disparate treatment discrimination to the deliberate, conscious,
and intentional actions of invidiously motivated actors. These actors pur-
portedly know when they act in a discriminatory manner, do so consis-
tently across situations, and then dissemble about the real reasons for their
decisions when challenged.0 3
In the remainder of this Part, we map the four pillars of modem social
psychology onto two nettlesome issues concerning the Title VII disparate
treatment doctrine. In Part IIA, we examine a principle known as the hon-
est belief rule and demonstrate that it derives from an intuitive model of
social perception and judgment that has been significantly discredited by
empirical social science research. This research, which implicates the
above-described principles of automaticity and subjective construal, un-
dermines many of the descriptive assumptions on which the honest belief
100. Rod Bond & Peter B. Smith, Culture and Conformity: A Meta-Analysis of Studies Using
Asch 's (1952b, 1956) Line Judgment Task, 119 PSYCHOL. BULL. 111 (1996).
101. See generally FISKE, supra note 74 (reviewing psychological research and theory relating to
the drive for social belonging).
102. Ross, supra note 33, at 337-84; Ross & NISBETT, supra note 96.
103. Krieger, The Content of Our Categories, supra note 6, at 1185.
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rule is premised. Next, in Part II.B, we scrutinize a doctrine known as the
same-actor inference, and argue that it is based on a naive psychology of
cross-situational consistency disconfirmed by research reflecting the prin-
ciple of behavioral situationism and the need for social belonging. Through
these analyses, we illustrate both the aims and the methods of behavioral
realism in employment discrimination law.
A. Discriminatory Motivation, Implicit Cognition,
and the Honest Belief Rule
Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
statute under which most federal employment discrimination cases arise,
provides in pertinent part that it is an unlawful employment practice "to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, sex,
national origin, or religion .... "4
This statute makes it unlawful to discriminate, yet it never defines
exactly what discrimination is. Congress, in essence, left to the courts the
task of assigning meaning to the term "discrimination" through a process
of judicial elaboration in case law. Given that race, sex, national origin and
other forms of discrimination implicate social perception, judgment, and
choice, this process of judicial elaboration necessarily relies on descriptive
models of how people go about making sense of themselves and others in
the social world. For this reason, judicial understandings of the nature of
the psychological processes involved in discrimination play a legally con-
stitutive role-that is, they determine the ultimate legal meaning of dis-
crimination.
Despite years of judicial elaboration, the meaning of discrimination is
still a work in progress. Following the Supreme Court's 2003 decision in
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,'05 an individual seeking to prove a discrimina-
tion case under Title VII's disparate treatment theory must establish three
things: 1) that s/he is a member of a Title VII protected class; 2) that s/he
was subjected to some negative employment action (e.g., a failure to hire
or promote, or a discharge from employment); and 3) that her/his protected
group status was a "motivating factor" in the challenged decision." 6 The
critical question of course, left for the courts' future explication, is what it
means for one's protected-group status to be a "motivating factor" in an
employment decision. In Part III below, we offer a constructive account,
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000).
105. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
106. Id. at 101. See generally Jeffrey A. Van Detta, "Le Roi est Mort; Vive Le Roi!": An Essay on
the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert
Palace, Inc. v. Costa Into a "Mixed Motives" Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71 (2003) (explaining the import
of Costa for the elements of proof in a Title VII disparate treatment case).
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informed both by behavioral realism and traditional methods of statutory
interpretation, of how, in our view, the phrase "motivating factor" should
be understood for Title VII purposes. In this Part, on the other hand, we
seek to show that many federal courts are according the phrase "motivating
factor" an unduly crabbed meaning, in part because they are basing their
legal analysis on faulty psychological models of intergroup perception and
judgment. This, we will argue, leaves many instances of disparate treat-
ment discrimination doctrinally unintelligible and therefore judicially irre-
mediable.
The doctrinal roots of this problem are reflected, ironically, in the plu-
rality opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,"7 a case we discussed in
Part I and in which one of the authors of this article testified as an expert
witness on the psychological science of cognitive bias," 8 and which was
widely considered a major civil rights victory. Consider again how Justice
Brennan, writing for the Price Waterhouse plurality, described what it
means for gender bias to "motivate" a challenged employment decision:
In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment
decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of
the decision what its reasons were and if we received a truthful
response, one of those reasons would be that the applicant or
employee was a woman. 109
This statement reflects an assumption that, when disparate treatment dis-
crimination occurs, the discriminator is, at the moment a decision is made,
consciously aware that he or she is discriminating. Gilbert Ryle refers to
this assumption as "the official theory" of transparent mental process and
describes it as follows:
[A] person has direct knowledge of the best imaginable kind of the
workings of his own mind. Mental states and processes are (or are
normally) conscious states and processes, and the consciousness
which irradiates them can engender no illusions and leaves the door
open for no doubts. A person's present thinkings, feelings and
willings, his perceivings, rememberings and imaginings are
intrinsically "phosphorescent"; their existence and their nature are
inevitably betrayed to their owner."10
Research on implicit social cognition has substantially discredited the
"official theory" Ryle described. Much of human mental process, including
those processes mediating interpersonal perception and judgment, occur in
107. 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
108. Dr. Fiske testified as an expert witness for the plaintiff, Ann Hopkins. For a description of
that testimony and the circuit and Supreme Court's reactions to it, see generally Martha Chamallas,
Listening to Dr. Fiske: The Easy Case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 15 VT. L. REV. 89 (1990).
109. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250.
110. GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 13-14 (1949).
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"the cognitive unconscious,"11 outside of the perceiver's mindful atten-
tional focus. In other words, actors often do not realize that they have
formed biased judgments of others. If you ask an employer at the moment
of the decision what his reasons for making a decision were, he might well
not be aware that one of the reasons was that the applicant or employee
was a woman, even if her sex did, in fact, influence his judgment.
Perhaps no single experiment better reveals how implicit stereotypes
can function as "Trojan Horses,"' 2 distorting the social judgment of even
well-intentioned people, than a well-known study by Princeton psycholo-
gists John Darley and Paget Gross.' 3 In an investigation of what they
called the cognitive confirmation effect, Darley and Gross had subjects
view one or two videotapes portraying a school-age child named
"Hannah." By manipulating the environment in which Hannah appeared,
Darley and Gross led subjects to believe that her family was either disad-
vantaged or affluent."4 Immediately after watching one or the other video-
tape, a subgroup of subjects in each income condition was asked to predict
whether Hannah would perform academically "at her grade level," "above
grade level," or "below grade level.""' 5 Reluctantly, and often under protest
at being asked to base a judgment on stereotypes, subjects in both condi-
tions tended to predict that Hannah would perform "at her grade level.""' 6
Before being asked to predict Hannah's ability level, a second sub-
group in each income condition was shown an additional videotape. This
videotape, identical across both conditions, depicted Hannah responding
verbally to twenty-five achievement test problems. Subjects were told that
the test included "easy, moderate, and difficult problems.""' 7 Hannah's
academic performance in this second video was deliberately designed to be
ambiguous. After watching the second video, subjects in the low-income
and high-income conditions were asked to evaluate Hannah's performance.
At this point, significant differences in the two income conditions emerged.
Subjects in the "affluent Hannah" condition rated her academic ability sig-
nificantly higher than subjects in the "disadvantaged Hannah" condition.
Open-ended comments revealed differences in perception as well. For
111. John F. Kihlstrom, The Cognitive Unconscious, 237 Sci. 1445, 1445 (1987).
112. Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005).
113. John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in Labeling Effects, 44 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 20 (1983).
114. In the "low income" condition, the video showed Hannah playing in a stark, fenced-in,
asphalt school yard in a run-down urban neighborhood. Subjects in this condition were told that
Hannah's parents had only a high school education, that her father was employed as a meat packer, and
that her mother was a seamstress who worked at home. In the "high income" condition, subjects
watched Hannah play in a tree-lined park in an upper middle class neighborhood. Her school was
depicted as a large, attractive modem structure, with adjacent playing fields and a shaded playground.
Her father was described as an attorney, her mother as a freelance writer. Id. at 23.
115. Id. at 20.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 23.
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example, subjects frequently described the low-income Hannah as having
"difficulty accepting new information,""' while they described high-
income Hannah as demonstrating the "ability to apply what she knows to
unfamiliar problems.""l
9
For our purposes, the key question is, if left uncorrected, would the
type of biased construal to which low-income Hannah was subjected in the
Paget and Gross study constitute a "motivating factor" within the meaning
of Title VII? Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has never squarely addressed
this precise question.
Federal disparate treatment case law does make clear that Title VII
prohibits employers from requiring that applicants or employees conform
to consciously endorsed, prescriptive stereotypes about what social posi-
tions members of particular groups (e.g., men versus women, Whites ver-
sus Blacks) should occupy or how members of particular social groups
should behave. 2° The case law also plainly establishes that Title VII is vio-
lated when employers deliberately use descriptive stereotypes about the
characteristics associated with various demographic groups as conscious
proxies for traits relevant to job performance.' 2'
Taken as a whole, these cases reflect a particular conception of how
consciously endorsed discriminatory beliefs express themselves as dis-
criminatory behavior that violates Title VII. Under this conception, stereo-
types are synonymous with consciously held beliefs, either about how
members of distinct social categories should behave (normative beliefs), or
about how members of distinct social categories are likely to behave (de-
scriptive beliefs). Encountering a member of one of these groups, a biased
decision maker maps the group member into a social category. That cate-
gory activates the consciously endorsed descriptive and normative beliefs
associated with the category. These in turn generate in the bias-holder a
conscious, belief-consistent behavioral intention toward the target, which,
unless actively overridden, directs the bias-holder's choices about and be-
havior toward the stereotyped target.
But social cognition research demonstrates that stereotypes do not
function only as explicit beliefs that are consciously applied in social
judgment and decision making. Just as importantly from a consequential
standpoint, stereotypes can function as implicit, associative networks that
118. Id. at 28.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985) (alleging sex
discrimination in employer's failure or refusal to hire a female applicant for a traditionally male job);
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (finding employer liable for sex discrimination
where evidence showed that some decision makers were motivated by plaintiff's failure to conform to
prescriptive sex stereotypes).
121. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (noting that employer may
be held liable for "sex-plus" discrimination when it uses female applicants' status as mothers of young
children as a proxy forjob commitment and availability).
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subconsciously predispose the stereotype holder to perceive, characterize,
and behave toward a stereotyped target in stereotype-consistent ways.
At a very early age, young Americans learn the stereotypes associated
with the various major social groups. 22 These stereotypes generally have a
long history of repeated activation, and are apt to be highly accessible,
whether or not they are believed. In other words, one can be "nonpreju-
diced" as a matter of conscious belief and yet remain vulnerable to the sub-
tle cognitive and behavioral effects of implicit stereotypes. Indeed, recent
neurological research using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
technology reveals that subjects who score low on measures of explicit
prejudice, but whose performance on the Implicit Association Test (IAT)'23
reveals negative implicit attitudes toward Black targets, exhibited both a
heightened startle response (measured by EMG eyeblink potentiation) and
elevated amygdala1 4 activation when viewing photographs of unfamiliar
Black faces.'25
Left uncorrected through motivated, effortful mental processing," 6
implicit stereotypes can exercise a powerful effect on social perception and
judgment. As social psychologists John Bargh and James Uleman, among
others, have demonstrated, merely encountering a member of a stereotyped
group primes the trait constructs associated with and, in a sense, constitut-
ing, the stereotype. Once activated, these constructs can function as im-
plicit expectancies, spontaneously shaping the perceiver's perception,
characterization, memory, and judgment of the stereotyped target." 7 The
122. See generally Patricia G. Devine, Automatic and Controlled Processes in Prejudice: The Role
of Stereotypes and Personal Beliefs, in ATTITUDE STRUCTURE & FUNCTION 181, 182-84 (Anthony R.
Pratkanis et al. eds., 1989). See also MARY ELLEN GOODMAN, RACE AWARENESS IN YOUNG CHILDREN
(rev. ed. 1964); Phyllis A. Katz, The Acquisition of Racial Attitudes in Children, in TOWARD THE
ELIMINATION OF RACISM 125 (Phyllis A. Katz ed., 1976).
123. For a description and discussion of the Implicit Association Test, see generally Anthony G.
Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association
Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464 (1998).
124. The amygdala is a small bilateral structure, each half about the size of an almond, located in
the temporal lobe. It plays a significant role in emotional learning and evaluation, and particularly in
the evocation of emotional responses to fear or aggression-inducing stimuli. Ralph Adolphs et al., The
Human Amygdala in Social Judgment, 393 NATURE 470 (1998).
125. Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation Predicts
Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 729, 730.
126. An example of such motivated mental processing is setting goals to individuate the target.
These goals moderate the seemingly inevitable amygdala reaction to outgroups' faces. Mary E.
Wheeler & Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Racial Prejudice: Social-Cognitive Goals Affect Amygdala and
Stereotype Activation, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 56 (2005).
127. See generally Bargh, supra note 95; Mark Chen & John A. Bargh, Nonconscious Behavioral
Confirmation Processes: The Self-Fulfilling Consequences of Automatic Stereotype Activation, 33 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 541 (1997); James S. Uleman et al., People as Flexible
Interpreters: Evidence and Issues From Spontaneous Trait Inference, in 28 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 211 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1996) (describing and reviewing literature on
spontaneous trait inference); John A. Bargh, The Four Horsemen of Automaticity: Awareness,
Intention, Efficiency, and Control in Social Cognition, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION 1, 1-2
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science of implicit bias demonstrates that disparate treatment can result not
only from the deliberate application of consciously endorsed prejudiced
beliefs, but also from the unwitting and uncorrected influence of implicit
attitudes and associations in the social-perception process.
The enormous body of research examining the influence of implicit
stereotypes on social judgment yields a set of key empirical findings that
challenge the conception of discrimination embedded in disparate treat-
ment doctrine. Subtle forms of intergroup bias can infiltrate decision mak-
ing long before any decision is made. These biases can latently distort the
perceptual data set on which that decision is ultimately premised. Often
operating outside of the decision maker's attentional focus, and therefore
outside his or her awareness, stereotypes can covertly but powerfully influ-
ence the way information about the stereotyped target is processed and
used. They can shape the interpretation of incoming information, influence
the manner in which that information is encoded into and stored in mem-
ory, and mediate the ease or difficulty with which the information is re-
trieved from memory and used in social judgment. A decision maker can
act because of or on the basis of a target person's race, sex, or other group
status, while subjectively believing that he or she is acting on the basis of
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.
As we will argue in Part III, Title VII's operative text prohibits these
subtle forms of discrimination, but the science of implicit stereotyping has
barely begun to influence federal disparate treatment jurisprudence. Indeed,
from a behavioral realist standpoint, in many circuits, judicial conceptions
of intergroup bias have actually regressed over the past two decades, even
as psychological science has surged toward an increasingly refined under-
standing of the ways in which implicit prejudices bias the social judgments
and choices of even well-meaning people.
One stark example of this arguably widening disconnect between the
legal design of discrimination and the science of everyday prejudice can be
found in a now decade-old doctrine known as the honest belief rule, which
posits that to rebut an employer's nondiscriminatory explanation of a chal-
lenged employment decision, a discrimination plaintiff must prove not only
that the employer's proffered reason is unworthy of credence, but also that
the employer did not honestly believe the reason it gave." 8
(Robert S. Wyer, Jr. & Thomas K. Srull eds., 2d ed. 1994); Daniel T. Gilbert, Thinking Lightly About
Others: Automatic Components of the Social Inference Process, in UNINTENDED THOUGHT 189, 194
(James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh eds., 1989). For a more recent treatment, discussing both automatic
and controlled processes from a dual-process model perspective, see generally Timothy D. Wilson et
al., A Model of Dual Attitudes, 107 PSYCHOL. REV. 101 (2000).
128. For a review of the honest belief-rule cases, see generally Rebecca Michaels, Note,
Legitimate Reasons for Firing: Must They Honestly Be Reasonable?, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2643
(2003).
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The honest belief rule, which has never been endorsed by the Supreme
Court, emerged first in the Seventh Circuit"' and later spread to the First, 3 '
Fourth,13 1 Fifth, 32 Sixth, 133 Eighth, 134 Ninth, 35 Tenth,136 Eleventh, 37 and D.C.
Circuits. 138 In an early decision typical of the genre, the Seventh Circuit in
Jackson v. E.J. Brach Corp. 139 held that a plaintiff could not prevail if the
decision maker "honestly believed in the non-discriminatory reasons it of-
fered, even if the reasons are foolish or trivial or even baseless.' ' 40 An even
starker formulation can be found in Crim v. Board of Education,41 in
which the court concluded that a plaintiff claiming pretext "has the burden
of showing that the employer's reason for the dismissal was a lie or had no
basis in fact.' 42 It is not enough, noted the court, to prove that the em-
ployer's stated reason was doubtful or mistaken. Even if the employer's
proffered reasons were "mistaken, ill-considered or foolish, if the [defen-
dant] honestly believed in those reasons then pretext has not been
proven."'143 The Eleventh Circuit adopted a similar approach in Jones v.
129. Kariotis v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 131 F.3d 672, 681 (7th Cir. 1997).
130. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Posadas de San Juan Assocs., 124 F.3d 243, 248 (1 st Cir. 1997) (identifying
the critical inquiry as "whether the employer believed that its proffered reason was credible").
131. Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc. 203 F.3d 274, 279-80 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 875
(2000).
132. Deines v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 280-81 (5th Cit.
1999).
133. Braithwaite v. Timken Co., 258 F.3d 488, 496 (6th Cit. 2001).
134. Eurle-Wehle v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 181 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cit. 1999) (declining to find
pretext despite the doubt cast by plaintiff regarding the soundness of defendant's proffered reason
because there was no evidence indicating that the reasons were "created to disguise an illegal
discriminatory motive"); see also Vaughn v. Roadway Express, Inc., 164 F.3d 1087, 1090-91 (8th Cir.
1998). At least one unpublished post-Costa decision from the District of Minnesota has rejected the
rule. Obike v. Applied EPI, Inc., No. Civ. 02-1653 (JRT/FLN), 2004 WL 741657, at *4-5 (D. Minn.
Mar. 24, 2004).
135. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002).
136. Evans v. Dean Foods Co., No. 99-4148, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 22519 (10th Cir. Sept. 6,
2000).
137. Cooper v. So. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 729-30, 732 (11 th Cir. 2004).
138. Fischbach v. D.C. Dep't of Corrections, 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
139. 176 F.3d 971 (7th Cit. 1999).
140. Id. at 984.
141. 147 F.3d 535 (7th Cit. 1998).
142. Id. at 541 (citation omitted).
143. Id. Accord Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1179 (7th Cit. 2002) (noting that "pretext"
means "lie"); Kulumani v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass'n, 224 F.3d 681, 693 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting
that to prove pretext, plaintiff must establish deceit); Pitasi v. Gartner Group, Inc., 184 F.3d 709, 717-
18 (7th Cit. 1999) (noting that to establish pretext, plaintiff must show that the employer did not
honestly believe the reasons it gave for its action); Flores v. Preferred Technical Group, 182 F.3d 512,
516 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that the employer need only supply an honest reason, not necessarily a
reasonable one); Hoffman v. MCA, Inc., 144 F.3d 1117, 1123 (7th Cit. 1998) (noting that the key
question in pretext inquiry is whether defendant honestly believes its proffered reason); Richter v.
Hook-SupeRx, Inc., 142 F.3d 1024, 1029-30 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that to establish pretext, plaintiff
must challenge the honesty of defendant's proffered reason); Jasmantas v. Suburu-lsuzu Auto., 139
F.3d 1155, 1157 (7th Cit. 1998) (applying the honest belief rule in an ADA disparate treatment case);
Kariotis v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Co., 131 F.3d 672, 676-77 (7th Cit. 1997) (noting that "if the company
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Gerwens:'4 "The law is clear that, even if a Title VII claimant did not in
fact commit the violation with which he is charged, an employer success-
fully rebuts any prima facie case of disparate treatment by showing that it
honestly believed the employee committed the violation."'
14
1
This approach is plainly inconsistent with what empirical social psy-
chologists have learned over the past twenty years about the manner in
which stereotypes, functioning not as consciously held beliefs but as im-
plicit expectancies, can cause a decision maker to discriminate against
members of a stereotyped group. 146 As Darley and Gross' Hannah study so
vividly illustrated, stereotypes can bias decision making implicitly by
skewing the manner in which inherently ambiguous information about the
stereotyped target is perceived, characterized, attributed, encoded in and
retrieved from memory, and used in social judgment. 47 Thus, it is perfectly
possible for a decision maker, whose biased judgment of a negatively
stereotyped target caused him to discriminate against that target, to believe
that his judgment and resulting decision were based entirely on legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons. Spontaneous biased construal, often occurring
outside of the decision maker's conscious attentional focus, can easily re-
sult in the differential treatment of members of a negatively stereotyped
group.
In societies or groups in which antidiscrimination norms are strong,
people are highly motivated to be seen by others, and to see themselves, as
nonprejudiced. 4  Thus, when faced with making a choice between
honestly believed in [its] reasons, the plaintiff loses even if the reasons are foolish or trivial or baseless"
and "the question is not whether the employer's reasons for a decision are 'right, but whether the
employer's description of its reasons is honest"'); Hartley v. Wis. Bell, Inc., 124 F.3d 887, 890 (7th
Cir. 1997) ("Plaintiffs lose if the company honestly believed in the nondiscriminatory reasons it
offered, even if those reasons are foolish or trivial or even baseless.").
144. 874 F.2d 1534 (1 th Cir. 1989).
145. Id. at 1540.
146. This approach is also inconsistent with what social psychologists describe as "motivated
reasoning." See generally Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480
(1990); T. Pyszczynski & J. Greenberg, Toward an Integration of Cognitive and Motivational
Perspectives on Social Inference: A Biased Hypothesis- Testing Model, in 20 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 297 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1987).
147. Irene V. Blair, Implicit Stereotypes and Prejudice, in COGNITIVE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE
PRINCETON SYMPOSIUM ON THE LEGACY AND FUTURE OF SOCIAL COGNITION 359 (Gordon B.
Moskowitz ed., 2001) (reviewing the relevant literature).
148. See Philip E. Tetlock et al., The Psychology of the Unthinkable: Taboo Trade-Offs,
Forbidden Base Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 853, 861-
63 (2000) (discussing findings that liberals were less likely to use race-tainted stereotypes, and those
who did tried to reaffirm their identity as fairminded); Wilson et al., supra note 127, at 100-12
(reviewing studies demonstrating that people hold both implicit, prejudiced attitudes and explicit,
egalitarian attitudes, and that explicit attitudes may, with sufficient motivation, override implicit
prejudices); Duane T. Wegener & Richard E. Petty, Flexible Correction Processes in Social
Judgment: The Role of Naive Theories in Corrections for Perceived Bias, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 36, 36 (1995) (discussing how subjects adjust their judgments of targets by "flexible
correction processes" when they are motivated to do so).
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members of different social groups, people whose preferences are implic-
itly shaped by group membership spontaneously search for independent
decision criteria consistent with their preference, and use those criteria to
justify their choices to themselves and others. 149 In a powerful series of ex-
periments, MIT business-management professor Michael Norton and his
colleagues demonstrated this effect in simulated hiring and higher-
education admissions decisions. They showed that subjects consistently
altered the qualifications they deemed most relevant to the selection of a
high-level construction manager, a stereotypically male job. When the
male candidate had more education and less relevant job experience, sub-
jects-who 'verwhelmingly preferred the male candidate-reported that
they viewed education as more important than job experience. When the
male candidate had more job experience and less education than the female
candidate, subjects ranked job experience as more important than educa-
tion. Either way, subjects tended to rank the criteria in a way that would
justify selection of the male candidate on the grounds that he was "better
qualified" than the female candidate they were rejecting. 50 However, when
subjects were forced to rank the selection criteria before seeing the candi-
dates' resumes, gender bias in selection largely disappeared. 5' Other stud-
ies demonstrate a similar "elasticity effect" through which decision
makers' judgments of the importance of various decision criteria shift in
ways that justify implicit ex ante preferences.1
5 2
In The Content of Our Categories, Krieger argued that one of the cen-
tral defects of disparate treatment doctrine in general, and the pretext
model of proof in particular, is the manner in which it constructs a false
dichotomy between "true reasons" and "phony reasons" for allegedly dis-
criminatory employment decisions.'53 Krieger stated that, in cases adjudi-
cated under the pretext paradigm, the purportedly "legitimate non-
discriminatory reason" proffered by the employer to explain a negative
action taken against a target employee had to be classified as either a "true
reason" or a "phony reason," a "mask," "sham," or "cover-up" for the em-
ployer's "true" discriminatory purpose.'5 4
Even after Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,' some courts continue to
rely on the honest belief rule, despite the fact that the rule developed as
149. Michael I. Norton et al., Casuistry and Social Category Bias, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 817, 829 (2004).
150. Id. at821.
151. Id. at 821-22.
152. Gordon Hodson et al., Processes in Racial Discrimination: Differential Weighting of
Conflicting Information, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 460 (2002); Christopher K. Hsee,
Elastic Justification: How Unjustifiable Factors Influence Judgments, 66 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 122 (1996).
153. See generally Kieger, The Contents of Our Categories, supra note 6, at 1178-81.
154. Id. at 1178.
155. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
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part of the pretext model of disparate treatment proof that the Court ap-
peared to reject when it extended Title VII's Section 703(m)'s "motivating
factor" analysis to all Title VII cases. The post-Costa record, albeit still
limited in size, is surprisingly mixed. Courts in the Seventh and Eighth
Circuits have continued to apply the honest belief rule in individual dispa-
rate treatment cases,156 including those filed under Title VII. 15 7 As of this
writing, only one court, in the District of Minnesota, has refused to apply
the doctrine on the grounds that its analytical foundations were undermined
by Costa.'5 8
Why should it matter that the intuitive psychology underlying the
honest belief rule is unsound? The answer, of course, is that it may or may
not matter, depending on the purposes being served by a court's decision
whether or not to adopt it. In elaborating what it means for group status to
be a motivating factor within the meaning of Title VII, courts necessarily
balance a variety of competing considerations. Such considerations might
include a recognition of the significant stigma associated with labeling an
employer as a "discriminator" or a desire to focus scarce judicial resources
on the potentially most meritorious cases. But none of the honest belief
rule cases cite any such rationale in support of the rule. Rather, the logic of
the honest belief rule decisions points to the operation of an unstated and
unexamined judicial theory about the nature of discriminatory motivation
itself-that when people discriminate they know that they are doing so.
The honest belief rule assumes that a reason proffered by an employer to
explain its action is either, in the words of Price Waterhouse, an "honest
answer," or a deliberate lie.
But as we have seen, empirical cognitive social psychology has dem-
onstrated that the lay psychological theory that underlies the honest belief
rule is woefully incomplete. Stereotypes can influence social decision mak-
ing through processes of subjective construal that occur outside of con-
scious, attentional focus. A well-meaning but implicitly biased decision
maker can believe that he is basing a judgment about a member of a stereo-
typed group on legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons when, in fact, the tar-
get's group membership "caused" the decision maker to view the target in
a unjustifiably negative light. For this reason, the honest belief rule would
have little place in a behaviorally realistic disparate treatment doctrine.
156. Sembos v. Philips Components, 376 F.3d 696, 701, 703 (7th Cir. 2004) (applying honest
belief rule in post-Costa ADEA case and affirming district court's grant of sunmary judgment to the
defendant); Jennings v. Mid-Am. Energy Co., 282 F. Supp. 2d 954 (S.D. Iowa, 2003) (post-Costa
decision applying the honest belief rule in a post-Costa Family and Medical Leave Act case and
granting summary judgment to employer).
157. Walker v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 329 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (W.D. Wis. 2004)
(applying the honest belief rule in a post-Costa race- and gender-discrimination case premised on 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 and on Title VII).
158. Obike v. Applied EPI, Inc., No. Civ. 02-1653 (JRT/FLN), 2004 WL 741657, at *4-5 (D.
Minn. Mar. 24, 2004).
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B. Dispositionism, Situationism, and the Same Actor Doctrine
One of the most important insights emerging from social psychology
in the past fifty years is the principle that situations, along with one's sub-
jective construal of those situations and one's attempt to negotiate the con-
flicting pressures they impose, exert a far more powerful effect on people's
behavior than the "intuitive psychologist" generally assumes. 59 This prin-
ciple is often referred to as "situationism," and it contrasts with the "dispo-
sitionism" that often characterizes common-sense psychological theories
about what makes people act the way they do.
People usually explain other people's behavior in terms of personality
traits or stable dispositions: "Why didn't Sam get his brief done on time?"
"He's a procrastinator, that's why." "Why did Robert promote Bill instead
of Mary?" "Are you kidding, Robert would never promote a woman; he's
such a sexist." Social psychologists label this tendency "dispositionism."
People tend to blame or credit other people's dispositions in explaining
their behavior. 6 ' Yet empirical social psychology has repeatedly demon-
strated that situations, along with people's attempts to negotiate the con-
flicting constraints under which they perceive themselves to be operating in
those situations, exert a powerful effect on behavior.
Dispositionism has profoundly influenced the way people think about
discrimination. People tend to view intergroup bias as though it were a
kind of stable disposition, analogous to a personality trait, which expresses
itself consistently across time and situation. Indeed, following the lead of
Nobel Laureate Gary Becker, economists often describe this bias as a "taste
for discrimination.""'' Under this view, if a person is going to discriminate
against members of a particular group, we expect him to do so consistently.
We view tastes as relatively stable phenomena.
Of course, there is some merit to this view. Under certain circum-
stances, past behavior is a reasonably good predictor of future behavior. As
recent research in social-personality psychology has shown, in some cir-
cumstances, clusters of personality traits can interact with a particular
situation to predict behavior pretty reliably-in that situation.162 And, at
159. See Ross, supra note 33.
160. The tendency toward over-attribution of behavior to dispositions, often referred to as the
"fundamental attribution error," appears to have a cultural component. It can be seen far more
dramatically in attribution in U.S. subjects than in subjects studied in other countries, including Korea,
Japan, China, and India. See generally Ara Norenzayan et al., Cultural Similarities and Differences in
Social Inference: Evidence From Behavioral Predictions and Lay Theories of Behavior, 28
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 109 (2002) (reviewing the relevant literature).
161. Gary S. Becker, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 41 (1957).
162. Yuichi Shoda et al., Intraindividual Stability in the Organization and Patterning of
Behavior: Incorporating Psychological Situations into the Idiographic Analysis of Personality, 67 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 674 (1994); Icek Ajzen, Nature and Operation of Attitudes, 52 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 27 (2001).
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least with respect to the more extreme forms of bigotry, prejudices do tend
to run in "packs."'1
63
That said, people, including judges, have a tendency to overestimate
the role of stable traits or tastes and to underestimate the role of situational
variables in shaping social perception and behavior. As social psycholo-
gists Lee Ross and Richard Nisbett have observed, unexpected behavioral
inconsistencies result from the fact that people operate in a state of ten-
sion."6 Some perceptions, thoughts, incentives, and concerns pull a person
in one direction; others pull him in another. Under such conditions, small
changes in a situation, or in a person's subjective interpretation of that
situation, can lead to surprising changes in the person's behavior.'65
Modem theory and research showing that unexpected shifts in human
behavior result from the operation of dynamic mental tension systems de-
rive primarily from work by Kurt Lewin and Leon Festinger, two of the
founders of modem experimental social psychology. In the early 1950s,
Lewin observed that "behavior has to be derived from a totality of coexist-
ing facts," that "have the character of a 'dynamic field."'"6 6 Because behav-
ior results from the interaction of all of the countervailing forces bearing
(or not bearing) on a person at any given time, it is simply not possible to
generate a set of mechanistic laws from which one can reliably predict
what particular response will result from a given stimulus.
In particular, as Festinger noted, a person's attitudes often conflict,
both internally and in relation to the attitudes of others in her social refer-
ence groups. These conflicts often place the individual in a state of tension,
which can lead to quite sudden shifts in perception, beliefs, and behav-
iors. '67 As Ross and Nisbett describe, a person's behavioral tendencies sit in
a kind of "quasi-stationary equilibrium." This equilibrium can be upset,
causing unexpected behavioral results in any of the following
ways: through adding or increasing behavior-impelling forces; by remov-
ing or weakening behavior-restraining ones; or some combination of the
two.16 Thus, while old-fashioned dominative racism might function like a
stable trait or taste, there is significant reason to believe that the expression
163. See generally BOB ALTEMEYER, ENEMIES OF FREEDOM: UNDERSTANDING RIGHT-WING
AUTHORITARIANISM (1988) (discussing how related attitudes and prejudices are clustered in the
"authoritarian" personality); John Duckitt, A Dual-Process Cognitive-Motivational Theory of Ideology
and Prejudice, in 33 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 41 (Mark. P. Zanna ed., 2001); JIM
SIDANIUS & FELICIA PRATTO, SOCIAL DOMINANCE: AN INTERGROUP THEORY OF SOCIAL HIERARCHY
AND OPPRESSION (1999); Clark Freshman, Whatever Happened to Anti-Semitism? How Social Science
Theories Identify Discrimination and Promote Coalitions Between "Different'" Minorities, 85 CORNELL
L. REV. 313 (2000) (reviewing research on co-occurrence of different types of discrimination in biased
organizations and individuals).
164. Ross & NISBETT, supra note 96, at 13.
165. Id. at 14-15.
166. KURT LEWIN, FIELD THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 25 (Dorwin Cartwright ed., 1951).
167. Leon Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison Processes, 7 HuM. REL. 117 (1954).
168. Ross & NISBETT, supra note 96.
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of implicit bias is far less consistent across situations. Why would this be
so?
As noted earlier, people learn at a very early age the stereotypes asso-
ciated with different social groups in their society. 169 As a person gets older
and is exposed to more egalitarian ideals, however, she may consciously
reject the proposition expressed by a stereotype she has learned. However,
when this occurs, neither the associations the stereotype comprises nor the
emotional states that accompany them are necessarily replaced by a new
enlightened attitude. Rather, the cognitive and emotional associations that
formed the earlier biased attitude often continue to exist alongside the
stereotype-holder's new, more enlightened conscious belief.17 This leaves
the social perceiver with "dual attitudes" toward members of the stereo-
typed group, one implicit and the other explicit. 7 '
According to social psychologist Timothy Wilson and his associates,
"[w]hen dual attitudes exist, the implicit attitude is activated automatically,
whereas the explicit one requires more capacity and motivation to retrieve
from memory."'72 A person who holds a dual attitude will react to a stereo-
typed target in dramatically different ways, depending on whether implicit
or explicit attitudes dominate the perceiver's judgmental process while he
or she is forming an impression of the stereotyped target. One situation
may make the explicit, nonbiased belief salient, thus conducing to nondis-
criminatory action conforming to or reflecting that belief. Yet another
situation might potentiate implicit, biased attitudes and associations, such
as those measured by the implicit association test. Once activated, the im-
plicit attitude may bias perception and judgment of the other person. Under
Wilson's dual-process model, biased implicit attitudes will have a rela-
tively greater effect on an actor's behavior either when there is little oppor-
tunity for controlled processing, or when in a particular situational context,
the actor does not view his behavior as expressing his attitude toward a
stereotyped group.'73
169. See discussion infra p. 55 and note 122.
170. See, e.g., Wilson et al., supra note 127; Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their
Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 6-7 (1989).
171. Wilson et al., supra note 127, at 104.
172. Id.
173. Timothy Wilson's dual-process approach to implicit and explicit attitudes is similar to the
"MODE (Motive and Opportunity as DEterminants) Model" developed by Russell Fazio. According to
this model, research indicating that people often express quite different attitudes toward the same
attitude object in differing contexts can be explained by reference to the differing circumstances under
which implicit versus explicit attitudes dominate social information processing. Explicit attitudes tend
to influence behavior when people have both the motivation and the opportunity to engage in
conscious, deliberative thought. On the other hand, when behavioral responses are spontaneous, or
when people lack the opportunity or motivation to deliberate, implicit attitudes play a more dominant
role. Russell H. Fazio, Multiple Processes by Which Attitudes Guide Behavior: The MODE Model as
an Integrative Framework, in 23 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 75 (Mark. P. Zanna ed.,
1990).
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Although one might expect that explicit and implicit attitudes toward
a particular subject would be strongly positively correlated, this is not al-
ways the case. While the degree of positive covariation is relatively high
with respect to attitudes toward objects that are not socially sensitive (like
dentists or snakes), this is not true with respect to dual attitudes about so-
cially sensitive subjects, such as Whites' attitudes toward Blacks.'74 For
example, in a meta-analysis of twenty-seven experiments involving a total
of 1,562 White subjects, social psychologist John Dovidio found only a
modest relationship between explicit measures of racial attitudes toward
Blacks and implicit attitudes as measured by the IAT, other response la-
tency tests, facial EMG, and galvanic skin response techniques.
17 5
As Greenwald and Krieger describe in the science overview appearing
earlier in this Symposium,'76 implicit bias toward members of devalued
groups often contradicts people's conscious egalitarian attitudes, beliefs,
and self-concepts.'77 A self-consciously egalitarian decision maker who
harbors implicit bias against members of a stereotyped or otherwise deval-
ued group necessarily relates to members of that group through a tension
system. Changes, even small changes, in the situation in which the implic-
itly biased but self-consciously egalitarian decision maker perceives,
evaluates, and makes decisions about a stereotyped group member can pro-
foundly alter the decision maker's judgment and behavior.
These principles, now widely accepted in the psychological sciences,
have been almost completely overlooked in the judicial elaboration of Title
VII's disparate treatment doctrine. As we have already observed in our dis-
cussion of the honest belief rule, disparate treatment doctrine expects bi-
ased decision makers to discriminate consistently.
Another judicial manifestation of this expectation can be found in a
doctrine known as the "same actor inference," which emerged in 1991 in
the Fourth Circuit's decision in Proud v. Stone,'78 an age discrimination
case. Mr. Proud, a sixty-eight-year-old accountant, was hired in the spring
of 1985 to serve as a Chief Accountant in the Army's Central Accounting
Division in Ludwigsburg, Germany. Robert Klauss, who selected Proud for
the position, had considered other applicants for the position, but ultimately
selected Proud due to his superior background, education, and experience.
174. John F. Dovidio & Russell H. Fazio, New Technologies for the Direct and Indirect
Assessment of Attitudes, in QUESTIONS ABOUT QUESTIONS: INQUIRIES INTO THE COGNITIVE BASES OF
SURVEYS 204, 220-21 (Judith M. Tanur ed., 1992); John F. Dovidio et al., Implicit and Explicit
Attitudes: Examination of the Relationship between Measures of Intergroup Bias, in BLACKWELL
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: INTERGROUP PROCESSES 175, 177, 183 (Rupert Brown & Samuel
L. Gaertner eds., 2001).
175. Dovidio et al., supra note 174, at 183-86.
176. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations 94
CALIF. L. REV. 945 (2006).
177. Id. at X
178. 945 F.2d 796 (4th Cit. 1991).
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In considering the applicants, the court noted, Mr. Klauss listed them on a
chart, which included a column noting each applicant's age.
Proud began his job in mid-June. He never performed the particular
duties for which he was hired, however, because immediately after he
started working, one of his colleagues resigned, and he agreed to assume
her responsibilities on a temporary basis. In short order, Mr. Klauss be-
came dissatisfied with Proud's handling of these accounts, and by mid-
October 1985, Klauss recommended that Proud be fired, which he was.
At trial, Proud presented substantial evidence that his age was a moti-
vating factor in Klauss's decision to terminate him. He showed that Klauss
based the termination recommendation on conduct that was not only con-
sistent with standard accounting practices, but also with relevant Army
regulations. He showed that younger accountants had done the same thing
and were not disciplined for it and that he was replaced by a younger indi-
vidual. He also presented evidence indicating that the delays in his produc-
tion of certain reports, mentioned by Klauss in his termination
recommendation, had been caused by several difficulties in acquiring nec-
essary data. Not only were some of the provided data erroneous, but Proud
had not been trained for these particular job duties. They were not in his
original job description, and Proud had merely agreed to assume them tem-
porarily.
In affirming the district court's decision to grant the defendant judg-
ment as a matter of law, the Fourth Circuit stated that it did not even need
to consider the plaintiff's evidence of discriminatory motivation because
one fact overwhelmed all others: the person who made the decision to fire
Mr. Proud had, only five months earlier, made the decision to hire him.
Judge Wilkinson wrote for the panel:
In assessing whether Proud established that age was a motivating
factor for his discharge, we focus on the undisputed fact that the
individual who fired Proud is the same individual who hired him
less than six months earlier with full knowledge of his age. One is
quickly drawn to the realization that "[cllaims that employer
animus exists in termination but not in hiring seem irrational."
From the standpoint of the putative discriminator, "[i]t hardly
makes sense to hire workers from a group one dislikes (thereby
incurring the psychological costs of associating with them), only to
fire them once they are on the job." '79
Judge Wilkinson continued:
Therefore, in cases where the hirer and the firer are the same
individual and the termination of employment occurs within a
relatively short time span following the hiring, a strong inference
179. Id. at 797 (citing John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1017 (1991)).
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exists that discrimination was not a determining factor for the
adverse action taken by the employer. While we can imagine
egregious facts from which a discharge in this context could still be
proven to have been discriminatory, it is likely that the compelling
nature of the inference arising from facts such as these will make
cases involving this situation amenable to resolution at an early
stage. 1
80
This portion of the opinion has come to be known as establishing the same
actor inference.
Several aspects of the panel's decision here are worth noting. First,
and perhaps most importantly, the panel was not simply holding that the
fact that the same person who made the decision to fire Mr. Proud had ear-
lier made the decision to hire him was probative 81 of whether Mr. Proud's
age influenced the firing decision and was therefore admissible to disprove
discriminatory motivation. Rather, the Fourth Circuit in Proud found this
fact is so probative that it relieved the court of the need to examine any of
the other evidence bearing on the issue of discriminatory motivation.82 The
same actor doctrine, under this formulation, functions not merely as an in-
ference, which can be drawn or not drawn as the trier of fact deems appro-
priate given the facts and circumstances of the case as a whole. Instead, the
Proud court treated the same actor rule as a judicially mandated infer-
ence-a presumption18'3-that once raised can be rebutted only through the
plaintiff's introduction of clear and convincing evidence.'84
180. Id. at 797-98 (emphases added).
181. Under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence is "relevant" if it has "any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401. In other
words, evidence is relevant if it has probative value for the determination of some fact at issue in the
litigation. See CHARLES TILFORD MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 184 (John W. Strong ed.,
5th ed. 1999). To be relevant, evidence need not conclusively prove the ultimate fact at issue. It need
only have a tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the action more or less
probable than it would otherwise be. 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 401.04[2][C] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN'S
FEDERAL EVIDENCE].
182. Proud, 945 F.2d at 797 ("In order to decide this case, we need not engage in a point-by-point
rebuttal of each of plaintiff's manifold contentions.").
183. A presumption is a procedural rule narrowing the discretion accorded the trier of fact. Under
such a rule, if a predicate fact (Fact A) is accepted by the trier of fact as true, the presumed fact (Fact B)
must, as a matter of law, also be taken as true, unless rebutted by contravening evidence. WEINSTEIN'S
FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 181, § 301.02[l]. Presumptions can be rebuttable or irrebuttable, but in
either case, they amount to judicially mandated inferences. GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 3.2 (3d ed. 1996).
184. Under Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the raising of a presumption imposes on
the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet it.
However, it does not ordinarily shift either the burden or the applicable standard of proof. See FED. R.
EVID. 301; Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (noting that the raising of a
presumption of discrimination by plaintiff's establishment of the elements of a prima facie case in a
Title VII disparate treatment case imposes on the defendant an obligation to come forward with
evidence rebutting or meeting the presumption but does not shift the burden of proof); Price
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This is, in fact, how the doctrine has been constructed in many cir-
cuits. For example, in Coghlan v. American Seafoods Co.,5 the Ninth
Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment to a defendant in a Title VII
national origin discrimination case who had based its motion for summary
judgment on the same actor inference. In challenging that grant of sum-
mary judgment on appeal, the plaintiff argued'86 that, under long-standing
Supreme Court precedent,'87 a trial court considering an employer's motion
for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law is not permitted to
draw inferences in favor of the moving party.'88 Because the same actor
inference is, after all, an inference, argued the plaintiff, it had no proper
place in the adjudication of a summary judgment motion.
In rejecting the plaintiff s argument, Ninth Circuit Judge O'Scannlain
stated that the same actor inference was not "a mere possible conclusion
for the jury to draw,"'89 but rather was a "'strong inference' that a court
must take into account on a summary judgment motion"' 9 and that could
be overcome only by an "extraordinarily strong showing of discrimina-
tion."''
The Fifth Circuit took a similar approach in Brown v. CSC Logic,
Inc.9 2 CSC Logic was an age discrimination case in which the district court
had granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Noting that
CSC's CEO Winston Kimzey had hired the plaintiff Robert Davis at age
fifty-four and then fired him "only four years later,"'93 the Fifth Circuit
adopted the same actor inference for the reasons expressed in Proud,
namely that "'claims that employer animus exists in termination but not in
hiring seem irrational. ""9' Although, in adopting the inference, the Fifth
Circuit did not rule out the possibility that a plaintiff could theoretically
adduce facts sufficient to overcome the inference raised by a same actor
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (noting that Plaintiff's proof in a Title VII case that sex
was a motivating factor in the challenged decision shifted the burden of proving nondiscrimination to
defendant; however, it did not heighten the standard of proof to one of clear and convincing evidence).
As acknowledged in Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 301, Congress may provide that a higher standard
of proof apply to some presumptions. However, exceptions to the preponderance of the evidence
standard are rare. WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 181, § 301.02[3][b].
185. 413 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2005).
186. Id. at 1096-97.
187. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
188. Coghlan, 413 F.3d at 1097 (noting that in entertaining a motion for summary judgment, "the
court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party," because "the drawing of
legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge" (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S.
at 150)).
189. Coghlan, 413 F.3d at 1098.
190. 1d.
191. Id. at 1097.
192. 82 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1996).
193. Id. at 658.
194. Id.
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fact pattern, the court found that the plaintiffs in that case, and Mr. Davis in
particular, had simply not succeeded in doing so.
And what was that evidence which was insufficient in the face of a
same actor fact pattern to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the ques-
tion of whether Kimzey was biased against plaintiff Davis because of his
age? Among other evidence, plaintiffs showed that Kimzey, the "same
actor" in question, had said on the occasion of Davis's remarriage, "'you
don't need to be remarrying a young woman again; you can't even get it
up.""5, 95 On various other occasions, Kimzey referred to plaintiff Davis as
"an 'old goat."" 96 At a management meeting, Kimzey said to Davis,
"'[Y]ou just can't remember, you're getting too old,"' and at another time,
Davis testified, Kimzey asked him whether "'senility was setting in."'197
Despite this and other evidence of age-based stereotyping, the Fifth Circuit
upheld summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to ade-
quately rebut what it referred to as the "Proud presumption.' 98
Not all circuits approach same actor evidence in this way. In Johnson
v. Zema Systems Corp.,' 99 a race discrimination case, the Seventh Circuit
characterized the same actor rule as a simple inference that a trier of fact
may draw or decline to draw as it sees fit. The court based this conclusion,
in part, on insights from social cognition theory, observing that "an
employer might be unaware of his own stereotypical views of African-
Americans at the time of hiring."2 ° The Third Circuit takes a similar ap-
proach, holding that a same actor fact pattern "is simply evidence like any
other and should not be accorded any presumptive value.""'' Likewise, in
Wexler v. White's Fine Furniture, Inc.,2"2 the Sixth Circuit held that the
same actor inference is just that, an inference, which is neither judicially
mandated nor appropriately drawn in favor of a party moving for summary
judgment.20 3 Hence, different circuits continue to disagree in their assess-
ment of the same actor doctrine.
So what can behavioral realism offer this debate? Not surprisingly, the
answer is, "it depends." Specifically, it depends on how the same actor rule
is interpreted and applied, and on the functions the rule is expected to
serve. Conceivably, for example, a court might design a same actor pre-
sumption to provide employers with an incentive to hire members of disfa-
vored groups. The judicial pitch would go something like this:
195. Id. at 656.
196. Id.
197. CSC Logic, 82 F.3d at 656.
198. Id. at 658 n.25.
199. 170 F.3d 734, 745 (7th Cir. 1999).
200. Id. Accord Kadas v. MCI Systemhouse Corp., 255 F.3d 359, 361 (7th Cir. 2001).
201. Waldron v. SL Indus., Inc., 56 F.3d 491,496 n.6 (3d Cir. 1995).
202. 317 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
203. See id. at 573-74.
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Hire a member of a protected group (e.g., women, ethnic or racial
minorities, people with disabilities, older workers), and give them a
try. If they don't perform to your standards, you can fire them. And
if they sue you for discrimination, the fact that you hired them in
the first place will provide you with a judicially mandated
presumption of nondiscrimination that can be rebutted by the
plaintiff only by clear and convincing evidence, enabling you, in
most cases, to prevail on summary judgment.
This may sound far-fetched, but it bears strong resemblance to one
justification for the same actor rule offered by the Fourth Circuit panel in
Proud v. Stone. Judge Wilkinson explained the benefits of the rule as fol-
lows:
Our holding advances the aims of the statute. For almost any
employer, there will be cases where an individual hired for a
position does not meet the employer's expectations and a
termination ensues. If former employees in these situations bring
ADEA claims that are allowed to proceed to trial, employers may
fear that a costly suit is possible even when there are completely
legitimate reasons for a discharge. When this is coupled with the
fact that individuals are far more likely to bring suits for
discriminatory discharge than for discriminatory failure to hire,
there is a grave risk that employers who otherwise would have no
bias against older workers will now refuse to hire them in order to
avoid meritless but costly ADEA actions. Courts must promptly
dismiss such insubstantial claims in order to prevent the statute
from becoming a cure that worsens the malady of age
discrimination.2"
Under this logic, the same actor inference works as a kind of judi-
cially created free-enterprise zone, in which civil rights enforcement would
be relaxed to encourage employers to hire members of protected groups. If
a rule like the same actor inference were premised on such policy grounds,
the empirical validity of the doctrine's underlying premise-that people
who hire members of protected groups are unlikely to be biased against
them-would be analytically inconsequential. Other types of arguments
would bear far more weight in any debate over the doctrine's wisdom or
fairness. These might include arguments based on dignitary interests of the
workers whose civil rights would be weakened, on whether such a con-
struction of the statute satisfied established norms of statutory interpreta-
tion, or on countervailing policy concerns.
Most circuits, however, including the Fourth Circuit where the doc-
trine originated, justify the same actor rule on grounds of adjudicative ac-
curacy and efficiency. An employer decision maker who has participated in
a decision to hire a member of a protected group, the argument goes, is so
204. Proud, 945 F.2d at 798 (citation omitted).
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unlikely to express bias against him at a later date that a "strong inference"
or presumption of nondiscrimination is justified on forensic grounds. Why
does such an inference seem so commonsensical? Because it coheres with
dispositionism, a strong belief in the cross-situational consistency of ex-
pressions oil bias in discriminatory behavior. However, a great deal of em-
pirical research suggests that dispositionism, the common-sense model of
behavioral consistency on which the same actor inference is based, is
deeply flawed, and that human behavior is far less consistent across situa-
tions than lay people tend to believe.
Awareness within social psychology of dispositionism's flaws
emerged as early as the late 1960s, with Walter Mischel's landmark book,
Personality and Assessment."5 Reviewing the then-existing research litera-
ture, Mischel demonstrated that across situations, most behavior shows a
consistency, expressed as a Pearson's correlation coefficient, of only about
0.3. This means (squaring the correlation coefficient to calculate the ex-
plained variance) that in the studies Mischel reviewed, only about 9% of
the variance in a person's behavior was predicted by the person's allegedly
stable personality traits.20 6
The relentless cataloging of cross-situational behavioral inconsistency
that followed Mischel's opening salvo prompted two types of responses
among personality researchers. One response was to aggregate observa-
tions across many instances of behavior, thus reducing the effects of con-
text and measurement error."07 Using this method, some researchers
reached behavior-behavior correlations as high as 0.80 (a respectable 64%
of variance in behavior predicted by past behavior). However, to achieve
correlations this high required averaging across many separate observations
and glossing over sometimes stark situational inconsistencies.
A second response to Mischel's findings involved abandoning the ef-
fort to find broad cross-situational behavioral consistency and substituting
a search for behavioral consistency within similar types of situations. Re-
searchers taking this approach created a set of contingent propositions
(if... then) that could detect the interplay of behavior and situation.2 ' For
205. WALTER MISCHEL, PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT (1968).
206. To illustrate, one of the studies included in Mischel's review was conducted in the 1920s by
Theodore M. Newcomb. In this study of fifty-one boys in twenty-one situations in summer camp, the
degree of extraversion or introversion was measured by concrete behaviors such as talking time, time
spent playing alone, and the like. The average correlation among behaviors across situations was 0.14.
Squaring this value reveals that less than 2% of the variance in subjects' behavior could be explained
by the purported trait of introversion/extroversion. THEODORE M. NEWCOMB, CONSISTENCY OF
CERTAIN EXTROVERT-INTROVERT BEHAVIOR PATTERNS IN 51 PROBLEM BOYS (1929).
207. Seymour Epstein, The Stability of Behavior: I. On Predicting Most of the People Much of the
Time, 37 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1097-126 (1979).
208. Walter Mischel, Toward an Integrative Science of the Person, 55 ANN. REV. OF PSYCHOL. 1
(2004); Walter Mischel & Yuichi Shoda, A Cognitive-Affective System Theory of
Personality: Reconceptualizing Situations, Dispositions, Dynamics, and Invariance in Personality
Structure, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 246 (1995); Yuichi Shoda, et al., Links Between Personality Judgments
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example, one person might behave "aggressively" only in the narrow sense
of verbally bullying subordinates, whereas another might behave "aggres-
sively" only in physical fights in a bar. While research along these lines
demonstrated that behavioral consistency could be found at meaningful
levels within similar situational contexts, the same could not be said of be-
havior across differing situations.
So far, we have discussed research indicating that people's past be-
havior poorly predicts their future behavior in different situations. Along
similar lines, another body of research shows that people's attitudes (more
specific than their traits or dispositions in general) also fail to predict be-
havior consistently across situations. In the late 1960s, A. W. Wicker re-
viewed the existing research correlating attitudes and attitude-relevant
behavior. He found that the correspondence between verbally expressed
attitudes and overt attitude-relevant behavior was only about 0.3, as meas-
ured by Pearson's correlation. °9 This revelation shocked attitude research-
ers, who had made the comrnon-sense assumption that people's attitudes
would accurately predict their behavior.
Attitude researchers reacted to Wicker's work in much the same ways
that personality researchers reacted to Mischel's. By aggregating behav-
ioral responses across many trials, researchers were able to find a reasona-
bly respectable attitudinal "signal" within the ambient situational
"noise."21 However, detecting this signal required averaging across many
observations, among which there could be significant situation-to-situation
variance. In short, this research showed that attitudes could predict behav-
ior in certain circumstances, but only if enough observations were aggre-
gated.
Other researchers further refined their approach to understanding the
complex relationships between behaviors, attitudes, and situational vari-
ables by creating a complex predictive equation that predicted future be-
havior as a function of expressed attitudes, salient social norms, and the
actor's perceived control over his behavior. These factors together did a far
better job of predicting future behavior than any of them alone.1
In short, whether attitudes predict behavior depends on the attitude,
the context, and the person.12 Some attitudes (e.g., strong, unambivalent
ones), some contexts (e.g., those emphasizing acting on one's values), and
and Contextualized Behavior Patterns: Situation-Behavior Profiles of Personality Prototypes, 11 Soc.
COGNITION 399 (1993).
209. A. W. Wicker, Attitudes Versus Actions: The Relationship of Verbal and Overt Behavioral
Responses to Attitude Objects, 25 J. OF Soc. IssUEs 41 (1969).
210. Ajzen, supra note 162.
211. Icek Ajzen & Martin Fishbein, Attitudes and the Attitude-Behavior Relation: Reasoned and
Automatic Processes, in EUR. REV. OF SOC. PSYCHOL. 11 (Wolfgang Stroebe & Miles Hewstone eds.,
2000).
212. FISKE, supra note 74, ch. 6.
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some people (those for whom values are especially important) show higher
attitude-behavior correlations than others (e.g., weak attitudes in norm-
driven contexts for socially-oriented people). The relevant point here is that
even professional psychological scientists have to jump through many
measurement hoops to detect stability in the expression of a person's un-
derlying attitudes. Just as the law cannot take for granted that past behavior
will predict future behavior in a different context, so it cannot take for
granted that attitudes, even strongly held ones, will be consistently ex-
pressed across different situational contexts.
For present purposes, the important point is that bias, understood as an
attitude toward members of a particular group, only predicts overt dis-
crimination under certain circumstances. Whether biased decision makers
will act in a way that expresses their bias varies as a function of many dif-
ferent variables, including the influence of social norms, the extent to
which particular social norms are made salient in particular situations, de-
cision makers' perceptions of control, their motivation to avoid biased de-
cision making, and the apparently relevant information they have at their
disposal.2 13
In general, people will judge others only when they feel entitled to do
so, either on the basis of their position or on the basis of having sufficient
information.2 4 Thus, people tend to refrain from using their stereotypes, or
making any judgment at all, when they lack what they perceive to be deci-
sion-relevant information. However, possessing even the illusion of infor-
mation is sufficient to free people to make judgments. For example,
Belgian researcher Vincent Yzerbyt and colleagues showed that people
made more extreme and confident stereotypic judgments when they were
told that a flash of light represented subliminal individuating information
about the decision target-even though it was indeed merely a flash of
light.2 15
John Darley and Paget Gross's "Hannah" study, described in Part
II.A, also suggests that the intuitive psychology underlying the same actor
inference lacks validity. Darley and Gross's findings vividly demonstrate
that social perceivers' resistance to or unintended reliance on implicit
stereotypes varies dramatically depending on whether a particular situation
makes antidiscrimination norms salient. People do not believe that baldly
making social predictions or judgments based on stereotypes is appropriate,
and they do not want to be perceived by others as doing so. For example,
213. Susan T. Fiske & Steven L. Neuberg, A Continuum of Impression Formation, From
Category-based to Individuating Processes: Influences of Information and Motivation on Attention and
Interpretation, in 23 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. I (Mark. P. Zanna ed., 1990).
214. Jacques-Philippe Leyens, et al., The Social Judgeablity Approach to Stereotypes, in 3 EUR.
REV. OF SOC. PSYCHOL. 91 (Wolfgang Stroebe & Miles Hewstone eds., 1992).
215. Vincent Y. Yzerbyt, et al., Social Judgeability: The Impact of Meta-Informational Cues on
the Use of Stereotypes, 66 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 48 (1994).
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when subjects were asked to make a prediction based on socio-economic
information alone, Darley and Gross found that the subjects tended to pro-
test. If forced to proceed, they tended to keep their predictions close to a
neutral mean. Nonetheless, the same stereotypes eschewed by subjects
when they were presented transparently readily found expression in social
evaluation tasks performed in an ostensibly more implicit or "information
rich" context.
The implications of this study for the same actor inference are both
obvious and powerful. First, the study suggests that intergroup bias does
not function as a stable trait or preference across all situations in a work-
place. Whether implicit bias will result in discriminatory behavior turns on
characteristics of the particular situation in which a social perceiver finds
herself, the way she construes that situation, and the way she understands
the conflicting constraints on her behavior within the situation. Small
changes in the situational context of judgment and choice can give rise to
marked behavioral inconsistency.
There are well-founded reasons for believing that implicit bias will
express itself less readily in the hiring context than later in the employment
relationship. In particular, the hiring context tends to make equal employ-
ment opportunity (EEO) norms and goals salient. As such, managers may
be more vigilant about inhibiting responses based on stereotypes or other
implicit attitudes. Moreover, during the hiring process, human-resources
specialists or EEO managers may play a role in selecting applicants for a
"short list," may be present at interviews, or may review decisions for
compliance with the employer's EEO policies and goals. Where this oc-
curs, the person who actually makes the hiring decision may be influenced
in ways that blunt the effects of any implicit stereotypes he holds. How-
ever, this influence may wane as time goes on and equal opportunity goals
become less prominent.
Accurate prediction of an applicant's future performance is often dif-
ficult because the hiring decision is based on the minimal information con-
tained in a resume or gleaned from a brief interview. In these
circumstances, employment decision makers, like Darley and Gross's sub-
jects, may forbear from making decisions based on stereotypes. However,
once the selected employee begins performing, the decision maker, now a
performance evaluator, may be influenced by implicit stereotypes in the
same ways Darley and Gross's subjects were. In the context of the infor-
mation rich day-to-day evaluation of often ambiguous employee behaviors,
equal opportunity goals are generally not salient, and decision makers are
likely to be operating under conditions of relatively greater cognitive busy-
ness. They can often believe they are basing tepid or outright negative
evaluations of stereotyped employees exclusively on "legitimate
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non-discriminatory reasons, ' rather than on perceptions and judgments
biased by implicit stereotypes.
There is, in short, little reason to believe that an implicitly biased em-
ployment decision maker who has hired a stereotyped person will necessar-
ily succeed in keeping his or her subsequent evaluations of that person's
performance free from the influence of implicit stereotypes. Implicit
stereotypes are latent infiltrators of social perception and judgment.
Decision makers who hold egalitarian beliefs but are affected by implicit
bias operate in the very type of tension system that Ross and Nisbett de-
scribe. Subtle differences in the social, physical, or organizational envi-
ronment can be expected to introduce a great deal of inconsistency into
such a decision makers' perceptions, judgments, and decisions about the
stereotyped target. Under these conditions, cross-situational consistency in
intergroup perception and judgment simply cannot be expected to rise to
the level required to support a presumption, or even a "strong inference,"
like the same actor rule. As is the case with so much of federal disparate
treatment jurisprudence, the same actor inference is based on an intuitive
psychological model that has been disconfirmed by advances in cognitive
social psychology.
III
A BEHAVIORAL REALIST RECONSTRUCTION OF INDIVIDUAL DISPARATE
TREATMENT THEORY:
DEFINING AND (DIs)PROVING DISCRIMINATORY MOTIVATION
What exactly would it mean to use insights from the science of im-
plicit bias to reconstruct Title VII disparate treatment theory from a behav-
ioral realist perspective? Would it require the overruling of Supreme Court
precedents, or, absent that, a statutory amendment? Would it, as two com-
mentators have recently suggested, amount to a judicially sanctioned pre-
sumption that "everyone is biased," such that "[t]he problem of
demonstrating actual discrimination goes away and claims of
discrimination become irrefutable?"2 '7 And perhaps most importantly from
a jurisprudential perspective, given the plain text of Title VII's statutory
language, could judges interpret its operative provisions through a behav-
ioral realist lens without exceeding their proper roles as "interpreters" as
opposed to "makers" of law?
In this section, we pursue two goals. First, we seek to demonstrate that
a behavioral realist interpretation of Title VII's anti-disparate treatment
216. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (establishing that, in
defending against a prima facie case of disparate discrimination, a defendant must articulate a
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the challenged decision).
217. Amy Wax & Philip E. Tetlock, We're All Racists at Heart, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2005, at
A16.
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principle is fully consistent with the statute's plain text, with Supreme
Court precedent, and with accepted, even conservative, methods of statu-
tory interpretation. Second, we will show that a behavioral realist reading
of Title VII's operative provisions would change relatively little about how
disparate treatment discrimination claims are proven or defended, either in
terms of the burden of proof borne by the plaintiff or in the types of evi-
dence a plaintiff would need to adduce to prove a claim. Far from repre-
senting a radical innovation in civil rights law, a behavioral realist
interpretation of the anti-disparate treatment principle would actually serve
to correct the truly radical innovations represented by doctrines like the
same actor inference and the honest belief rule, which are based neither in
the statute's text nor on Supreme Court precedent, and which have unjusti-
fiably narrowed Title VII's remedial reach.
A. A Textualist Reading of Section 703(a)(1)
As the Supreme Court stated in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, when
interpreting the meaning of Title VII, "the starting point for our analysis is
the statutory text."2 8 So, that is where we begin.
Title VII's Section 703(a)(1) provides in pertinent part: "It shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual . . . , because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin[.] 21 9 Thus, as noted in Part I, as originally enacted in 1964,
Title VII made it unlawful to "discriminate" on the basis of certain pro-
tected characteristics, but it nowhere defined precisely what the term "dis-
crimination" meant. Moreover, it should be noted, neither the word
"intentional" nor the phrase "intent to discriminate" appear anywhere in the
statutory text. The intent requirement itself is a judicial innovation.
The Second Edition of the Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary,
widely used in the early 1960s, provides no justification for the conclusion
that the word "discrimination" necessarily implies conscious intentionality.
That dictionary defines the verb "discriminate" as "to make a difference in
treatment or favor (of one as compared with others)."2 2 That definition has
endured: the Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language, Unabridged defines "discrimination" similarly, if a bit more
technically, as "the process by which two stimuli differing in some aspect
are responded to differently.""2
218. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98 (2003).
219. 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
220. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 237 (2d ed. 1956) (based on WEBSTER'S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY).
221. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE,
UNABRIDGED 648 (2002).
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There is nothing in either the text of Title VII nor the dictionary defi-
nition of the verb "discriminate" that limits the statutory text to differences
in treatment resulting from an employer's conscious intention to subordi-
nate (or favor) an individual because of his or her protected-group mem-
bership. Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that
the statute's remedial reach is broader than this crabbed interpretation. For
example, the Court has repeatedly stated that, in enacting Title VII,
"Congress intended to prohibit all practices in whatever form which create
inequality in employment opportunity due to discrimination on the basis of
race, religion, sex, or national origin."2 ' On other occasions, the Court has
observed, "Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or
otherwise." '223
Given conditions prevailing in the early 1960s, it is of course reason-
able to assume that conscious, purposeful disparate treatment was the most
salient evil against which Title VII was directed, at least as far as race dis-
crimination was concerned. But there is nothing in either the text of the
statute or the legislative history accompanying it that would foreclose other
meanings, as the Court's above-cited observations reflectY.2 4 Thus, the no-
tion that Section 703(a)(1)'s anti-disparate treatment principle proscribes
only the deliberate, willful use of an employee or applicant's protected-
group status in an employment decision is a judicial innovation, not a legis-
lative one. What the plain language of Section 703 requires is that an em-
ployer not allow an applicant or employee's group status to play a causal
role in any employment decision.2 5
One could nonetheless argue that in 1964, in using the term "discrimi-
nate" in Section 703(a)(1), Congress contemplated only willful bigotry, as
this is arguably the way the term was most commonly understood in the
early 1960s. This reading would arguably comport with the textualist prin-
ciple that, in interpreting an ambiguous statutory term, one should attribute
to legislators the intention "to say what one would be normally understood
222. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976); see also
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (applying this principle in establishing the
disparate impact theory of Title Vi liability).
223. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 526 (1993) (quoting Green, 411 U.S. at 801);
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 (1989) (same); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 349 n.31 (1977) (same); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273,
280 n.8 (1976) (same).
224. As Justice Scalia observed in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998),
"statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we
are governed."
225. Professor Krieger, writing with Professor Rebecca Hanner White, has advanced this
argument in detail elsewhere, and so, for purposes of brevity, it will not be further developed here.
White & Krieger, supra note 21.
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as saying, given the circumstances in which one said it."'226 Thus, the argu-
ment would go, in 1964, the term "discrimination" generally was under-
stood to mean "intentional discrimination," with "intent" defined as
synonymous with "design" or "purpose. 1 27 Such an interpretation, were it
accepted, would arguably exclude from the statute's reach disparate treat-
ment based on implicit stereotypes, or other implicit mental processes or
associations of which the decision maker was not aware and did not delib-
erately set out to manifest.
This argument would confront a number of serious problems, how-
ever. The first lies in the semantic structure of Section 703(a)(1) itself. As
described earlier, the section provides, among other things, that it is an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to "fail or refuse 12 8 to hire
an individual because of his or her protected-group status. "Fail" and "re-
fuse" have very different meanings. In the early 1960s "to fail" was com-
monly defined as meaning "to fall short," "to err; to be mistaken. 2 29 More
recent and complete dictionaries define "fail" in pertinent part as "to be
deficient or unable to meet a test or standard of attainment," or "to err in
judgment: be in error, "23 ° "to be deficient or inadequate. '23 1 To "refuse," on
the other hand, means "to withhold... compliance," "to show or express a
positive unwillingness to do or comply with. '232 Refusal connotes willful-
ness, as opposed to the mere missing of the mark connoted by failure.
Thus, in its very semantic structure, Section 703(a)(1) indicates that the
concept of discrimination comprises two variants: one willful and deliber-
ate, the other a mere falling short of some egalitarian goal or aspiration.
B. Discriminatory Motivation, Congressional Intent,
and the 1991 Amendment of Section 703
The argument that Section 703(a)(1)'s use of the term "to discrimi-
nate" refers only to intentional action in its narrowest sense suffers from a
second and perhaps even more damning flaw. Specifically, in a portion of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified as Title VII's Section 703(m),
Congress amended Section 703's operative language, providing that "an
226. Joseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL
POSITIvISM 249, 268 (Robert P. George ed., 1996).
227. Such a reading would be supported by the Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary published in
1956. It defines "intent" as "purpose" or "design," and lists as additional synonyms "aim," "end,"
"objective," and "goal." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 220, at 438.
228. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2001).
229. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 220, at 296.
230. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 221, at 815.
231. MERRIAM-WEBSTER, WEBSTER'S ONLINE THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY,
UNABRIDGED (2002), http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com.
232. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 221, at 1910; MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, WEBSTER'S ONLINE THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED (2002),
http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com.
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unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a moti-
vating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also
motivated the practice. 233
The question thus becomes, what did Congress mean when it used the
term "motivating factor"? What does it mean for a protected-group charac-
teristic, like race or sex, to "motivate" an employment decision maker, and
what, if anything, is the difference between "motive" and "intent"?
Although they are similar, "motive" does not mean the same thing as
"intent." Black's Law Dictionary, for example, distinguishes the two con-
cepts as follows: "Motive is what prompts a person to act, or fail to act.
Intent refers only to the state of mind with which the act is done or omit-
ted. '234 A distinction between intent and motive, and the implications of
that distinction for the legal relevance of implicit stereotyping, has long
been made in the disparate treatment jurisprudence developed under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act.235 In these cases, courts have ac-
knowledged that an employment decision maker can, through the operation
of implicit stereotypes, be "motivated" by an applicant's or employee's
age, even absent a specific "intent" to discriminate on the decision maker's
part.
236
The Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language, Unabridged defines the word "motive" as "something within a
person (as need, idea, organic state, or emotion) that incites him to ac-
tion. ' 237 In other words, a "motivating factor" is an internal mental state, a
category that includes cognitive structures like implicit stereotypes or other
social schema that influence social perception, judgment, and action. For
race, color, sex, national origin, or other protected characteristics to "moti-
vate" an employment decision means that the characteristic served as a
stimulus which, interacting with the decision maker's internal biased men-
tal state, led the decision maker to behave toward the person differently
than he otherwise would.
233. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
234. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 727 (5th ed. 1979).
235. For a thorough discussion of the relevant case law, see Krieger, The Content of Our
Categories, supra note 6, at 1171.
236. Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 155 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that age
discrimination may arise from an unconscious application of stereotyped notions of ability); La
Montagne v. Am. Convenience Prods., Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1410 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Age discrimination
may be subtle and even unconscious."); Burlew v. Eaton Corp., 869 F.2d 1063, 1066 (7th Cir. 1989)
(holding that age discrimination may exist absent an intent to discriminate).
237. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 221, at 1475.
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C. Behavioral Realism, Legal Normativity, and the Nature of
Discriminatory Motivation
Given the plain meaning of the term "motivating factor," the question
then becomes, what are the various ways in which an applicant or em-
ployee's race, sex, or other Title VII-protected characteristic might influ-
ence a covered employer's decision-making process? This is obviously a
question about human psychology, about which psychological science
rightly has much to say.
Many different mental processes can cause an employment decision
maker to "respond differently" to members of different social groups. At
the most blatant end of the spectrum, for example, an employer might re-
fuse to hire or promote a woman to a particular position because he be-
lieves that women should not hold jobs of the type in question. Or, the
employer might refuse to hire a Latino as opposed to an Anglo because he
believes that, on average, Anglos are more conscientious than Latinos, and
he is using ethnicity as a proxy for future productivity. Open, deliberate
application of these sorts of explicit normative and descriptive stereotypes
is easily recognizable as discrimination, but it does not represent the only
way in which two people differing with respect to race, gender, or some
other Title VII protected trait, can be "responded to differently" '238 because
of that trait.
As shown in earlier work by Krieger and others,239 and as other arti-
cles in this Symposium describe,24° discrimination-the process by which
two people differing in some respect are responded to differently--does
not result only from the deliberate application of consciously endorsed
prejudiced beliefs. Such differences in response can also result from the
application of implicit attitudes, including implicit stereotypes-networks
of mental associations that predispose the stereotype-holder to perceive,
characterize, and behave toward members of different socially categorized
groups in different ways.
However, just because it is possible that implicit stereotypes might
distort perception and judgment in a way that results in discrimination does
not make it inevitable that they will do so in any given case. As Hal Arkes
and Philip Tetlock have observed,241 and we described in detail in Part II
above, context is a powerful moderator of implicit bias. Recognizing that
implicit bias may cause a decision maker to perceive, judge, or behave dif-
ferently toward a member of a Title VII-protected group does not relieve a
238. See WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 222, at 237.
239. See sources cited supra note 21.
240. Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of
"Affirmative Action, " 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063 (2006); Christine Jolls & Cass Sunstein, The Law of
Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969 (2006).
241. Hal R. Arkes & Philip E. Tetlock, Attributions of Implicit Prejudice, or "Would Jesse
Jackson 'Fail' the Implicit Association Test?" 15 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 257, 275 (2004).
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discrimination plaintiff of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
this in fact occurred in his or her case. As the Supreme Court stated in
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,2 42 in a Title VII
disparate treatment case, "[p]roof of discriminatory motive is critical,
although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differ-
ences in treatment.
243
The critical question is this: if a Title VII plaintiff is able to prove that
the unwitting application of derogating race, gender, or ethnic stereotypes
motivated a decision maker and thus deprived her of an employment op-
portunity, has she proven that her race, gender, or ethnicity was a "motivat-
ing factor" within the meaning of Title VII? Doctrines like the same actor
inference and the honest belief rule, and the lay psychological theories
judges use to justify them, function only to obscure rather than resolve the
important normative choice this question represents.
Given the plain meaning of the operative words of Section 703, and
the Supreme Court's prior statements about the normative goals underlying
Title VII,244 it would be difficult to justify an interpretation of the statute
that excluded from its remedial reach employment discrimination resulting
from the thoughtless application of derogating gender, racial, or ethnic
stereotypes. Nothing in the Supreme Court's prior precedents, particularly
those postdating the amendment of Section 703 in 1991, could create a rea-
sonable reliance interest in such a narrow reading of the anti-disparate
treatment principle.
Behavioral realism, then, does not substitute empirical findings for
normative legal analysis. Rather, it challenges courts not to use faux em-
piricism to avoid facing difficult normative choices head on. As David
Faigman suggests, the use of insights from the empirical social sciences
can often force a court "to confront the value choices it [is] making. 245
Seen in this way, behavioral realism conduces not to judicial activism, but
to judicial restraint. Science restrains judges by holding them accountable
for their rhetorical use of empirical claims in legal analysis.
D. Proving and Disproving Discriminatory Motivation
At this point, an astute reader might well be asking, "What about
proof? What kind of evidentiary showing would be required to establish
motivation if we were to adopt the theory of intergroup bias toward which
behavioral realism points?" Although a thoroughgoing explication of proof
of discriminatory motivation would require a much higher word limit than
242. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
243. Id. at 335 n.15.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 215 and 217.
245. David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the Empirical
Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 541, 608 (1991).
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the new law review article length guidelines permit, the question is apt and
we feel compelled to provide at least some discussion of this issue.
Those who anticipate a radical change in the types of evidence liti-
gants will proffer to prove or disprove discriminatory motivation under a
behaviorally realistic interpretation of Section 703 will be disappointed (or
perhaps relieved) by what we propose here. As Krieger suggested in
1995,246 disparate treatment resulting from the mindless application of un-
corrected implicit stereotypes can be proven or disproven through the same
types evidence long recognized as relevant on the question of intent in dis-
parate treatment adjudication. Under the framework we propose, the evi-
dence would remain much the same, but the inferences reasonably drawn
from that evidence, and the nature of the ultimate fact the evidence would
be offered to prove, would expand to accommodate the insight that dispa-
rate treatment can result from the uncorrected influence of implicit stereo-
types as well as from their deliberate, fully conscious use.
In this regard, consider again the description in Part I of how a plain-
tiff in a disparate treatment case goes about establishing a valid, legally
cognizable claim. To establish entitlement to legal relief, this plaintiff must
introduce admissible evidence sufficient to establish the existence of each
essential element of the disparate treatment claim, including the intent ele-
ment-that is, that her protected group status was a "motivating factor" in
the challenged employment action. However, as in most cases, which must
be proved or disproved through circumstantial evidence, it is not the evi-
dence placed into the record that establishes or disestablishes an essential
element of the particular claim for relief on which it was offered. Rather, in
most situations, the essential elements may be proved through the presenta-
tion of numerous evidentiary facts that, taken together with each other and
with the reasonable inferences drawn from them, potentially establish the
existence of each essential element by a preponderance of the evidence.
Over the past thirty-three years, the Supreme Court has described the
types of evidentiary facts a trier of fact may consider in a disparate treat-
ment case in deciding whether the plaintiffs protected group status was a
motivating factor in a challenged employment decision. These include:
* Comparative evidence showing whether similarly situated persons
not in the plaintiffs protected group were treated more favorably
than the plaintiff or other members of the plaintiff s group;247
* Statements or expressive conduct by decision makers evincing
negative stereotypes or attitudes toward the plaintiff or others in
his or her protected group;248
246. See generally Krieger, The Contents of Our Categories, supra note 6, at 1242.
247. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151-52 (2000); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).
248. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151.
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* The employer's willingness to tolerate harassment of the plaintiff
or other members of the plaintiffs protected group;
2 49
* The employer's general pattern of treatment of members of the
plaintiffs group, including statistical evidence;25°
" The specific decision maker's treatment of plaintiff and other
members of the plaintiff's protected group;25'
" Whether the defendant has come forward with evidence of a le-
gitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action; 52
" Whether the nondiscriminatory reasons proffered by the defendant
fail to rationally explain the decision it made or are otherwise un-
worthy of credence;253
* Whether the nature or operation of the employer's decision-making
process left room for the operation of bias;254 and
* Whether the employer had in place and applied effective mecha-
nisms for detecting the possible influence of bias and for prevent-
ing such biases from influencing the ultimate decision made. 5
Under the behaviorally realistic approach to defining discriminatory
motivation described earlier, these species of evidence are as probative as
they have always been. What changes under a behavioral realist interpreta-
tion of Section 703(m) is the set of inferences that can reasonably be drawn
from these species of evidence and what exactly "discriminatory
motivation" means, as an essential element of the plaintiffs disparate
treatment claim. For example, comparative evidence showing that an
African-American plaintiff was treated more harshly than a similarly situ-
ated White employee in a disciplinary situation could be offered to show
that implicit stereotypes had caused the decision maker to perceive the
plaintiff's misconduct to have been more serious, reprehensible, or likely to
recur, than the similar misconduct of the White comparator. Statements
made by the decision maker that suggest that the decision maker harbored
stereotype-infused attitudes or beliefs could bolster such an inference,
whether such statements were directed toward the plaintiff or not. On the
other hand, the decision maker's record of hiring or promoting other Afri-
can-Americans might tip the balance the other way.
The point is that in any given case, particular pieces of evidence may
not be legally sufficient to compel a finding of discriminatory motivation,
but legal doctrine should not be so constrictive as to deprive the trier of fact
249. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 188 (1989) (noting proof of disparate
treatment under 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
250. Green, 411 U.S. at 804-05.
251. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151-52; Patterson, 491 U.S. at 188; Green, 411 U.S. at 804-05.
252. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
253. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147; St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993).
254. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
255. Id.
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of its proper role in determining whether, taken together, they are. The trier
of fact's proper role is to consider all the evidence and combine it with in-
ferences it deems reasonable in order to determine whether the challenged
conduct violates the operative terms of the statute as interpreted by existing
legal doctrine.
In determining in disparate treatment cases what inferences would be
reasonably drawn from particular evidentiary facts, or in describing the
meaning of discriminatory motivation or intent, judges are constantly using
psychological theories. As we have shown, disparate treatment doctrine has
been premised on numerous factual suppositions about the nature, causes,
and characteristics of intergroup bias. These suppositions are neither indi-
cated nor justified by sound principles of statutory interpretation, and in
many respects, they are descriptively inaccurate. In the Title VII context,
naive psychological theories like those underlying the same actor and hon-
est belief rules function primarily to obscure an ideologically premised and
jurisprudentially unjustifiable constriction of the statute's remedial reach.
CONCLUSION
EMPIRICISM, BEHAVIORAL REALISM, AND THE NORMATIVITY OF LAW
Behavioral realism does not attempt to introduce social science into
normative legal reasoning. Rather, it seeks to extract from normative legal
reasoning the intuitive social science already there and to subject it to em-
pirical scrutiny. Understood as a normative theory of adjudication, behav-
ioral realism seeks to hold judges accountable for their rhetorical use of
empirical propositions that have in fact been invalidated by advances in the
empirical social sciences.
Although behavioral realism sounds in empiricism, its agenda is ulti-
mately normative in the sense that it challenges judges to satisfy the rigors
of empiricism when they deploy empirically testable claims to bolster their
legal reasoning. If a legal doctrine like the same actor inference described
in Part II rhetorically relies on a testable social science claim, then that
claim should be open to scrutiny under empiricism's evaluative standards.
When a court, like the Supreme Court in Faragher and Ellerth, justifies its
adoption of an affirmative defense to otherwise meritorious harassment
cases on the grounds that anti-harassment training programs and grievance
procedures will prevent harassment from occurring, social science evi-
dence on this question is of undeniable import in evaluating the defense's
merit as a normative legal rule.
Antidiscrimination law has long incorporated and reified factual sup-
positions about the nature of prejudice. Discriminatory motivation is
equated with conscious intentionality. Social decision makers are presumed
to have unimpeded access to the true reasons behind the decisions they
make. Social decision making is construed as a process independent of
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social perception and judgment. Bias is presumed to function as a stable
trait, or taste, that "resides" within an individual decision maker and ex-
presses itself consistently over at least short periods of time, wholly inde-
pendent of the particular situation in which the decision maker perceives,
judges, and makes decisions about members of different social groups. But
well-established insights from psychological science, accumulated over
fifty years of peer-reviewed, replicated research, has called these supposi-
tions into serious doubt, if not discredited them entirely.
We do not yet know whether social psychology will eventually pro-
vide a simple, elegant, predictive model of human behavior. But in our
view, its value to law does not turn on its ability to do so. Empirical social
psychology is interesting because it produces vivid, replicable demonstra-
tions of how human beings tend to behave in particular contexts. Such
demonstrations are important to law because they often sharply contradict
widely accepted psychological intuitions that judges mistakenly think pro-
vide a simple, elegant, predictive model of human behavior.
One day, the United States Supreme Court, or some state supreme
court, will be confronted with a disparate treatment case in which the fact
finder has concluded that implicit stereotypes, operating outside of the de-
cision maker's conscious awareness, caused that decision maker to subject
a negatively stereotyped plaintiff to some negative employment action. In
that case, the trier of fact will have found that the decision maker was not
aware that implicit bias had influenced his judgment, but it will also have
found that implicit bias did in fact do so.
When that case comes before the Court for review, how should the
Court reason its way to an outcome? Surely, the Court should consider the
statutory text, the applicable legislative history, its earlier decisions, and
other traditional methods of legal reasoning. But these legal methods often
underspecify legal results. In the final analysis, the Court will face a nor-
mative choice. Behavioral realism stands for the principle that, in deciding
which normative choice to make, the Court should, where possible, use
psychological science, not a priori intuitive psychological theories, in de-
scribing, justifying, or predicting the consequences of its chosen legal rule.
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